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SAVING SMOKERS FROM THEMSELVES: THE 
PATERNALISTIC USE OF CIGARETTE TAXES 
 




Governments at all levels are increasingly relying on cigarette taxes to 
satisfy revenue needs.1  These taxes affect a shrinking minority and burden 
an activity that many view as sinful.  So legislators can increase these taxes 
at relatively low political cost.2  It comes as no surprise then that most states 
have increased their cigarette tax in recent years, with many doing so 
multiple times.3  As a result, cigarette tax revenue is substantial, exceeding 
$32 billion in 2010.4  To put that figure in perspective, the federal 
government anticipates that gift and estate tax revenue will total less than 
$26 billion for 2011 and 2012 combined.5 
Additionally, the tax burden on smokers is significant.  The federal tax 
is $1.01 per pack and the average state tax is $1.17 per pack.6  The highest 
combined federal, state, and local tax is $6.86 per pack in New York City, 
where a pack-a-day smoker pays over $2,500 per year in cigarette taxes.7 
Antismoking advocates often argue that taxing cigarettes is both an 
effective way to raise revenue and to force smokers to internalize the costs 
that smoking imposes on others.8  But a compelling case can be made that 
neither of these rationales supports the large tax burden currently placed on 
                                                 
* Associate Professor of Law, Texas Wesleyan School of Law.  I thank participants at the 2010 Central 
States Law Schools Association Conference, the Faculty Enrichment Series of Florida State College of Law, and 
the 2011 Law and Society Association Annual Meeting for helpful ideas and suggestions.  I also thank Frank 
Snyder for comments on an earlier draft. 
1 See, e.g., Eleanor Maag & David Merriman, Tax Policy Responses to Revenue Shortfalls, 29 STATE TAX 
NOTES 363, 367–72 (2003). 
2 Id. at 367–72; W. Kip Viscusi, Cigarette Taxation and the Social Consequences of Smoking, in 9 TAX 
POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 51, 52 (James Poterba, ed., 1995) [hereinafter Viscusi, Social Consequences]. 
3 45 ORZECHOWSKI & WALKER, THE TAX BURDEN ON TOBACCO 9–10 (2010) (ORDERED FROM 
WORLDCAT 11/22/11).  Between January 1, 2009 and January 1, 2011, 21 states and the federal government 
increased cigarette taxes.  Id.   
4 Id. at iv.  This figure includes federal, state, and local excise taxes for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2010.  
Id. 
5 Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Historical Tables, Table 2.5: Composition of “Other Receipts,” 1940–2016, 
THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals. 
6 ORZECHOWSKI & WALKER, supra note 3, at iv. 
7 See CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, TOP COMBINED STATE-LOCAL CIGARETTE TAX RATES (2010), 
available at http://tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0267.pdf.  The combined tax is composed of the 
federal tax of $1.01 per pack, the state tax of $4.35 per pack, and the city tax of $1.50 per pack.  The $2,500 figure 
assumes that the smoker actually buys her cigarettes in New York City. 
8 E.g., CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, TOBACCO TAX INCREASES ARE A RELIABLE SOURCE OF 
SUBSTANTIAL NEW STATE REVENUE 1–2 (2008), available at 
http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0303.pdf [hereinafter CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE 
KIDS, RELIABLE SOURCE]; Hearing Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means on the Financing Provisions of 
the Administration’s Health Security Act, 103d Cong. (1993) (statement of Jeffrey Harris). 
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tobacco.  Using cigarette taxes to raise revenue is problematic because 
smokers are disproportionately poor.  As a result, cigarette taxes are highly 
regressive.9  Moreover, several studies have concluded that the current 
average tax per pack more than covers any external costs borne by 
nonsmokers.10   
If external costs and the need for revenue do not justify higher cigarette 
taxes, then proponents of cigarette tax increases must rely on paternalism, 
i.e., the idea that the government should save smokers from themselves.11  
Paternalism is highly controversial.  It involves interfering with individual 
autonomy despite the absence of harm to third parties.  This gives rise to the 
accusation that paternalistic intervention unjustifiably forces paternalists’ 
values and beliefs onto others. 
Economists and economically oriented legal scholars have been 
particularly skeptical of paternalistic smoking regulations.12  Standard 
economic models generally assume that people are rational, which means, 
among other things, that we accurately weigh costs and benefits so as to 
make choices that maximize our utility (or well-being).13  At least partly as 
a result of their faith in people’s decision-making abilities, economists often 
advocate consumer sovereignty.  This is the principle that the government 
should respect people’s choices regarding what products to consume, and 
should interfere with those choices only to prevent harm to others.14   
To many non-economists, consumer sovereignty seems inappropriate in 
the case of cigarettes, which are addictive and cause health damage.  But 
some economists argue that people can rationally choose to consume 
addictive goods.15  If so, then it is not obvious why the government should 
treat the decision to smoke any differently than other consumption 
decisions.  Indeed, government efforts to reduce smoking would harm 
                                                 
9 See infra Part IV.D.  
10 See infra Part I.B.2. 
11 For purposes of this article, I define paternalism broadly as interference by the government with a person’s 
self-regarding decisions, where the government’s intent is to further that person’s welfare. Cf. Bill New, 
Paternalism and Public Policy, 15 ECON. & PHIL. 63, 65–71 (1999) (using a similar definition). 
12 W. KIP VISCUSI, SMOKING: MAKING THE RISKY DECISION (Oxford University Press) 144–46 (1992) 
[hereinafter VISCUSI, RISKY DECISION]; ROBERT D. TOLLISON & RICHARD E. WAGNER, THE ECONOMICS OF 
SMOKING ix–xi, 162–64 (1992); see also Thomas A. Lambert, The Case Against Smoking Bans, 13 MO. ENVTL. 
L. & POL’Y REV. 94, 103 (arguing that since smokers “appear to believe that the benefits that they experience 
from the activity outweigh the costs [it is] not at all clear that eliminating smoking will enhance social welfare”); 
Jonathan Gruber & Botond Koszegi, Is Addiction “Rational”? Theory and Evidence, 116 Q.J. Econ. 1261, 1285–
86 (2001) [hereinafter Gruber & Koszegi, Is Addiction Rational?] (explaining but rejecting the model of smoking 
that has led some economists to criticize paternalistic regulation). 
13See N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 496 (2007); Colin Camerer et al., 
Symposium, Preferences and Rational Chioce: New Perspectives and Legal Implications: Regulation for 
Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism”, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 
1214–15 (2003). 
14See, Paul Calcott, Paternalism and Public Choice, 17 VICTORIA ECON. COMMENT. 39, 39–41 (2000); 
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 59, 86–88 (1999) (SOURCE WAS CHECKED OUT 
AT LANGSAM, HJ 2572 .S84. 
15See Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, A Theory of Rational Addiction, 86 J. POL. ECON. 675, 694–95 
(1988) (considering the possible reasons an individual may have for consuming cigarettes). 
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smokers instead of helping them.  
But there are alternative theories of smoking consistent with a role for 
paternalism.  One theory is that smokers are incapacitated by addiction.  
Some physicians and public health advocates believe that addiction 
constitutes a disease that effectively deprives the addict of free will.16  If 
people smoke because they are incapacitated by addiction, then arguably 
smoking has no social value and the government’s goal should be to 
eliminate it.  
Another group of theories recognizes smoking as a choice but suggests 
that the choice is flawed—the product of smokers’ imperfect rationality.17  
These theories stem from a more general critique of the rational actor 
model—a critique spearheaded by a group of influential economists and 
legal scholars.18  These scholars rely on evidence from psychology and 
behavioral economics, which shows that people are not perfectly rational.  
Instead, people suffer from self-control problems as well as cognitive 
limitations and biases.19  These scholars argue that if people are imperfectly 
rational, then we may make mistakes that reduce our utility.  In theory, 
government intervention can avoid or correct these mistakes.20  Moreover, 
                                                 
16 E.g., U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., TREATING TOBACCO USE DEPENDENCE: 2008 UPDATE 6 
(2008) (“Tobacco dependence is a chronic disease.”); DENNIS L. THOMBS, INTRODUCTION TO ADDICTIVE 
BEHAVIORS 3–5 (1994) (describing the disease model of addiction) (Due 12/12/11 to Law Lib); Jacob Sullum, 
Blowing Smoke about Addiction, HOUS. CHRON., A23, March 25, 1997 (quoting David Kessler, a former 
commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration, who said, “Once they have started smoking regularly, most 
smokers are in effect deprived of the choice to stop smoking.”). 
17 Gruber & Koszegi, Is Addiction Rational?, supra note 12, at 1285–86; Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, 
The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex-Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1181–
1223 (1998) (arguing that Congress should reject a proposed tobacco settlement in favor of ex post-incentive 
based regulation). 
18 See generally Richard Thaler & Cass Sunstein, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 1159 (2003) (arguing that libertarian paternalists should “attempt to steer people’s choices in welfare-
promoting directions without eliminating freedom of choice”); Camerer et al., supra note 13; Gruber & Koszegi, 
Is Addiction Rational?, supra note 12; Jonathan Gruber & Botond Koszegi, Tax Incidence When Individuals Are 
Time-Inconsistent: The Case of Cigarette Excise Taxes, 88 J. PUB. ECON. 1959, 1980 (2004) (deviating from the 
traditional model by introducing “specific time-inconsistent preferences”) [hereinafter Gruber & Koszegi, Tax 
Incidence]; JONATHAN GRUBER & BOTOND KOSZEGI, A MODERN ECONOMIC VIEW OF TOBACCO TAXATION 17 
(considering the implications of the optimal tax for cigarettes) (2008) [hereinafter GRUBER & KOSZEGI, MODERN 
VIEW]; Jonathan Gruber, Government Policy Toward Smoking: A View from Economics, 3 YALE J. HEALTH 
POL’Y, L., & ETHICS 119, 120 (2002) (arguing that there is little support for the traditional economics model); 
Hanson & Logue, supra note 17; Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Optimal Sin Taxes, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 1825 
(2006) [hereinafter O'Donoghue & Rabin, Optimal Sin Taxes]; Ted O'Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Studying 
Optimal Paternalism, Illustrated by a Model of Sin Taxes, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 186 (2003) (proposing an approach 
for studying optimal paternalism).   
Mario Rizzo and Glen Whitman have challenged the claim that failures of rationality justify paternalism.  
Although they devote some attention to smoking, their subject is paternalistic regulation generally, and they 
discuss cigarette taxes only tangentially.  As a result, they do not address many of the issues on which this Article 
focuses.  See generally Mario J. Rizzo & D. Glen Whitman, The Knowledge Problem of New Paternalism, 2009 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 905 (2009) (discussing paternalism policies generally) [hereinafter Rizzo & Whitman, Knowledge 
Problem]; Mario Rizzo & D. Glen Whitman, Little Brother Is Watching You: New Paternalism on the Slippery 
Slopes, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 685 (2009) [hereinafter Rizzo & Whitman, Slippery Slopes]; D. Glen Whitman, Against 
the New Paternalism: Internalities and the Economics of Self-Control, POL’Y ANALYSIS NO. 563 (2006). 
19 E.g., Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 18, at 1159–70; Camerer et al., supra note 13, at 1211–19; Gruber & 
Koszegi, Is Addiction Rational?, supra note 12, at 1285–86. 
20 E.g., Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 18, at 1162; Camerer et al., supra note 13, at 1218. 
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unlike traditional paternalistic measures, this type of intervention would 
purportedly make us better off as judged by our own internal standards, not 
those of the paternalists who advocate the regulation.  In other words, the 
government could help us make the choices that we would make ourselves 
if we were perfectly rational.21 
In the smoking context, economists and legal scholars use evidence of 
imperfect rationality to challenge the claim that smoking is a welfare-
maximizing choice.22  For example, Jonathan Gruber and Botond Koszegi 
argue that many smokers would like to give up smoking but lack the self-
control23 to do so.24  They conclude that a paternalistic tax on cigarettes 
would make smokers better off by giving them an additional incentive to 
quit, in effect compensating for their lack of self-control.25   
If smoking results from incapacitation or imperfect rationality, then 
perhaps the government should intervene on smokers’ behalf.  But this 
Article challenges the claim that the government should use cigarette taxes 
for that purpose.  While there is evidence that smoking can be a rational 
choice, the Article does not claim that all smokers are acting rationally.  
Instead, the Article argues that even if some smokers are acting irrationally, 
a number of reasons exist to be skeptical of paternalistic cigarette taxes. 
Part I explains the theory that smoking is a rational choice and discusses 
evidence that supports it.  If this theory is correct, then paternalistic taxes 
are difficult to justify.   
Part II discusses evidence that, according to paternalists, shows that 
smoking is not a rational choice.  This evidence gives rise to the theory that 
smokers are incapacitated by addiction and to theories based on imperfect 
rationality. 
Part III argues that incapacitation does not justify paternalistic taxes.  
First, incapacitation does not appear to drive all or even most smoking 
behavior.  It is inconsistent with the fact that tens of millions of people have 
quit smoking.26  Second, even if we assume that some smokers simply 
cannot quit, cigarette taxes are not an appropriate response.  Taxes 
effectively punish these smokers by increasing the price of a product that 
                                                 
21 E.g., Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 18, at 1162 (stating that “it is legitimate for private and public 
institutions to attempt to influence people's behavior even when third-party effects are absent” because “in some 
cases individuals make inferior decisions in terms of their own welfare—decisions that they would change if they 
had complete information, unlimited cognitive abilities, and no lack of self-control”).   
22Gruber & Koszegi, Is Addiction Rational?, supra note 12, at 1285–86; Hanson & Logue, supra note 17, at 
1181–1223 (discussing the sources of consumer undeterrability). 
23For purposes of this Article, self-control simply refers to the inability of an individual to carry out the 
consumption plan that she deems best.  For a discussion of the issues involved in defining willpower, which is 
sometimes used as a synonym for self-control, see Lee Anne Fennell, Willpower Taxes, 99 GEO. L.J. 1371, 1376–
80 (2011) [hereinafter Fennell, Willpower Taxes]. 
24Gruber & Koszegi, Is Addiction Rational?, supra note 12, at 1261. 
25See Gruber & Koszegi, Is Addiction Rational?, supra note 12, at 1263. 
26CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, SUMMARY HEALTH STATISTICS FOR U.S. ADULTS: 2009 
NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY 10, 85 (2010) [hereinafter CDC].   
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they find it difficult or impossible to live without. 
Similarly, Part IV argues that imperfect rationality does not justify 
paternalistic taxes.  There are several reasons for this.  The first is 
heterogeneity.  Some people may smoke due to failures of rationality, in 
which case cigarette taxes have the potential to make them better off by 
encouraging them to quit.  But for others, smoking may be a rational choice.  
For example, a large percentage of smokers quit early enough that they 
virtually eliminate their risk of premature death.27  In other words, they 
smoke as young adults and then quit before the risk becomes very high.  
This suggests rational behavior.   
If smokers are heterogeneous with respect to rationality, cigarette taxes 
are misguided as a paternalistic tool.  Taxes are a one-size-fits-all solution 
that will harm rational smokers.  And this harm must be offset against (and 
may exceed) any benefit to those who are helped.   
The second reason is that paternalistic taxes create a significant 
potential for government failure.  Even if some smoking is caused by 
imperfect rationality, government intervention can harm smokers more than 
it helps them.  Government failure may occur for several reasons, including 
lack of control over smokers’ responses to taxation.  Many smokers respond 
to cigarette taxes in harmful ways, e.g., they smoke fewer cigarettes but 
switch to cigarettes higher in tar and nicotine.28  These responses can 
undermine the goal of improving public health, and the government cannot 
easily control them.     
The third reason is regressivity.  Low-income smokers respond to 
cigarette taxes by reducing spending on necessities, e.g., housing, which 
adversely affects low-income families.29     
The fourth reason is that potentially superior alternatives exist for 
helping smokers who suffer from imperfect rationality.  These include the 
commitment contract for smoking cessation and the smoking license.30  
These solutions address failures of rationality while reducing the possibility 
of government failure and avoiding the problems caused by heterogeneity.  
They are also more consistent with individual autonomy and do not impose 
a large burden on the poor.  
Part V discusses whether the goal of reducing youth smoking justifies 
                                                 
27See id. at Part I.A.2.   
28See id.at Part IV.B.3. 
29Susan Busch et al., Burning a Hole in the Budget: Tobacco Spending and its Crowd-Out of Other Goods, 3 
APPLIED HEALTH ECON. & HEALTH POL’Y 263, 267–71 (2004). 
30Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1399, 1482–85 (2005) (discussing the various 
alternatives to taxation as an incentive for smoking cessation) [hereinafter Fennell, Revealing Options]; see 
generally Xavier Gine et al., Put Your Money Where Your Butt Is: A Commitment Savings Account for Smoking 
Cessation, 2 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 213 (2010) (advocating a “commitment savings account” to 
incentivize individuals to quit smoking); Jay Bhattacharya & Darius Lakdawalla, Time-Inconsistency and Welfare 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 10345, 2004) (suggesting that smoking licenses are more 
effective than cigarette taxes).  
5
Lucas: SAVING SMOKERS FROM THEMSELVES: THE PATERNALISTIC USE OF CIGARETT
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2012
6 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
paternalistic taxes.  It argues that since the cigarette tax is a blunt tool for 
achieving this goal, the government should consider more narrowly targeted 
options, e.g., raising the minimum age for legal sale of cigarettes to twenty-
one.   
  
I.  SMOKING AS A RATIONAL CHOICE 
 
Given the enormous risks involved, why do people smoke?  According 
to some economists, the answer may be that smoking is a rational choice.  
Section A discusses rational addiction theory and evidence that supports it.  
Section B describes the theory’s implications for cigarette tax policy.  For 
purposes of this Article, the most important of these implications is that 
paternalistic taxes are unjustified. 
    
A.   Theory and Evidence 
 
Standard economic models generally assume that people are rational.31  
This means that we are informed and forward looking, and we accurately 
weigh the costs and benefits of our actions to maximize our own utility 
given our preferences, which generally are assumed to be stable.32 
It may seem impossible for this model to explain smoking because 
unlike many consumer goods, cigarettes are addictive and can cause health 
damage.  But Nobel Prize economist Gary Becker and coauthor Kevin 
Murphy have shown that addiction does not necessarily rule out the 
standard model.33  Rather, addiction simply complicates the cost-benefit 
calculation.  Instead of weighing the costs and benefits of smoking a single 
cigarette, a person must account for the possibility of addiction.34  
Addiction means that smoking today increases the desire to smoke in the 
future.  And future smoking increases both monetary costs (through 
additional cigarette expenditures) and health damage.  A rational smoker 
considers smoking’s current and future costs, taking addiction and health 
damage into account.  In other words, a smoker might know that she could 
become addicted and harm her health, but still choose to smoke anyway 
because she has rationally determined that smoking is worth the risk.   
Several types of evidence are consistent with the notion that smoking 
may result from rational calculation.  The first is evidence that smoking 
produces certain benefits.  The second is evidence that people consider 
                                                 
31 E.g., Gruber, supra note 18, at 120; MANKIW, supra note 13, at 496; Camerer et al., supra note 13, at 
1214–15. 
32 E.g., Gruber, supra note 18, at 120; MANKIW, supra note 13, at 496; Camerer et al., supra note 13, at 
1214–15; Becker & Murphy, supra note 15, at 675. 
33 Becker & Murphy, supra note 15, at 675. 
34 Id. at 675–82; GRUBER & KOSZEGI, MODERN VIEW, supra note 18, at 4; Gruber, supra note 18, at 120. 
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potential costs in deciding whether to smoke or to continue smoking.  And 
the third is evidence that smoking may have a lower subjective price for 
smokers than for nonsmokers. 
 
1. Possible Benefits of Smoking 
 
People may smoke because smoking produces benefits apart from 
avoiding the pain of withdrawal associated with quitting.  Some people may 
simply enjoy the taste of cigarettes.35  Others smoke because they believe 
(with some evidentiary support) that smoking has a number of positive 
effects, including reducing stress, depression, and anxiety, aiding in 
concentration and memory, preventing weight gain,36 and facilitating social 
interaction.37  Nicotine is an unusual drug that can both calm a nervous 
person and stimulate a sluggish one.38   
Moreover, just as tastes for other consumer goods may differ, tastes for 
smoking may differ.  In particular, smoking may deliver a larger benefit to 
people who are especially stressed, anxious, or depressed, which could 
explain why some people smoke and others do not.39 
Because of the risks involved, it may seem distasteful to discuss the 
potential benefits of smoking.  And the fact that smoking may yield certain 
benefits certainly does not mean that smokers should ignore the 
consequences to their health.  But it does mean that smoking is not 
obviously irrational.  Some people might decide that the risk is worth it in 
the same way that people rationally decide to engage in other risky 
activities, e.g., driving on busy highways or skiing.40   
 
                                                 
35 Frank A. Sloan & Yang Wang, Economic Theory and Evidence on Smoking Behavior of Adults, 103 
ADDICTION 1777, 1779 (2008). 
36For a discussion of whether quitting smoking leads to weight gain, see infra Part IV.B.3. 
37Stephen Heishman, a scientist at the National Institute on Drug Abuse, and his colleagues recently 
published a meta-analysis of 41 studies of the effects of nicotine on both smokers and nonsmokers.  Stephen 
Heishman et al., Meta-Analysis of the Acute Effects of Nicotine and Smoking on Human Performance, 210 
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 453, 453 (2010).  The study finds “significant positive effect sizes of nicotine on motor 
abilities, attention, and memory, which likely represent true performance facilitation.”  Id. at 464.  Because the 
study finds significant positive effects for nonsmokers as well as smokers, Heishman concludes that “nicotine’s 
performance enhancing effects might be one reason people decide to start smoking.”  Id..  See also Cynthia 
Pomerleau, Co-Factors for Smoking and Evolutionary Psychobiology, 92 ADDICTION 397, 400–01 (1997) 
(discussing the various reasons individuals provide for smoking); Naomi Breslau et al., Nicotine Dependence, 
Major Depression, and Anxiety in Young Adults, 48 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1069, 1071–73 (1991) 
(investigating the relationship between smoking and psychiatric disorders).  
In a survey of smokers aged 50–70, 41% reported that they had relapsed after quitting due to stress.  Only 
14% reported relapse due to habit or physical addiction. Ahmed Khwaja et al., Time Preference, Time 
Discounting, and Smoking Decisions, 26 J. HEALTH ECON. 927, 930 (2007) [hereinafter Khwaja et al., Time 
Preference].   
38Robert S. Goldfarb et al., Are Rival Theories of Smoking Underdetermined?, 8 J. ECON. METHODOLOGY 
229, 232 (2001); see also Pomerleau, supra note 37, at 400. 
39See Pomerleau, supra note 37, at 397–401. 
40Cf. Khwaja et al., Time Preference, supra note 37, at 930 (“Judging from the reasons that people give for 
quitting and relapsing, more is at work than simple physical addiction.”). 
7
Lucas: SAVING SMOKERS FROM THEMSELVES: THE PATERNALISTIC USE OF CIGARETT
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2012
8 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
2. Accounting for Smoking’s Costs 
 
There is substantial evidence that people consider potential costs in 
making decisions regarding smoking.  For example, many smokers respond 
to cigarette price increases by cutting back or quitting altogether.  Although 
findings vary, a typical estimate of the price elasticity of cigarettes among 
adults is roughly -0.3 to -0.5.41  This means that a 10% increase in price 
leads to a 3%-5% reduction in smoking, due to some smokers quitting and 
others cutting back.42  Moreover, although the issue is controversial, a 
recent study finds that even older smokers (those who are presumably the 
most addicted) respond to higher cigarette prices by quitting smoking.43  
The price elasticity studies establish that people generally do consider the 
immediate financial costs of smoking. 
People are also forward-looking and take into account future costs, e.g., 
possible health damage.  In 1964, the Surgeon General issued a report 
announcing that smoking significantly increases the risk of lung cancer and 
certain other illnesses, as well as premature death.44  Since then, the dangers 
of smoking have been well publicized, and the fact that smoking is 
dangerous is now common knowledge.45  Changes in the perceived risks of 
smoking have no doubt played a large role in the dramatic decline in the 
adult smoking rate, which fell from about 42% in 1965 to just under 21% in 
2009.46  This suggests rational, forward-looking behavior.47 
Another compelling piece of evidence that smokers account for health 
risks is the fact that so many people have quit smoking.  In the United 
States, there are as many former smokers as current smokers.48  And many 
former smokers quit to improve their health.49  Research has confirmed the 
dramatic health benefits of quitting smoking, even during old age.50  
                                                 
41FRANK A. SLOAN ET AL., THE PRICE OF SMOKING 9 (Massachusetts Institute of Technology 2004).   
42Id. 
43Philip DeCicca & Logan McLeod, Cigarette Taxes and Older Adult Smoking: Evidence from Recent Large 
Tax Increases, 27 J. HEALTH ECON. 918, 928 (2008) (finding “that a $1 increase [in the cigarette tax] results in a 
6–8% reduction in smoking participation among individuals aged 45–59”) [hereinafter DeCicca, Older Adult 
Smoking]. A number of earlier studies find very little responsiveness among older smokers.  For a review of this 
literature, see id. at 919–20.   
44U.S. SURGEON GENERAL, SMOKING AND HEALTH, 31–32 (1964). 
45VISCUSI, RISKY DECISION, supra note 12, at 78 (citing a survey in which 99% of respondents “had heard 
that cigarettes shorten life, and all of the respondents had heard that cigarettes are dangerous to one’s health”). 
46 See RONALD WILSON, CIGARETTE SMOKING AND HEALTH CHARACTERISTICS 1 (eds.) (1967) (ORDERED 
FROM OHIO LINK 11/21/11); CDC, supra note 26, at 88. 
47 See Becker & Murphy, supra note 15, at 687 (noting that the decline in the smoking rate after 1964 
“blatantly contradicts the view that the majority of smokers were myopic and would not respond to information 
about future consequences because they discounted the future heavily”). 
48 CDC, supra note 26, at 10, 85.  A current smoker is “someone who has smoked at least 100 cigarettes in 
their lifetimes and still currently smokes;” former smokers consist of people “who have smoked at least 100 
cigarettes in their lifetime but currently do not smoke at all.”  CDC, supra note 26, at 86. 
49 Lynn C. Larabie, To What Extent Do Smokers Plan Quit Attempts?, 14 TOBACCO CONTROL 425, 426 
(2005); Khwaja et al., Time Preference, supra note 37, at 930.  
50 Donald Taylor et al., Benefits of Smoking Cessation for Longevity, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 990, 994 
(2002); U.S. SURGEON GENERAL, THE HEALTH BENEFITS OF SMOKING CESSATION vi–vii, 8 (1990) [hereinafter 
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Quitting can substantially reduce the risk of smoking-related illness and 
significantly prolong life.51   
Not only have many smokers quit altogether, smoking duration (i.e., the 
period of time a smoker smokes before quitting) is also on the decline.52  In 
other words, smokers are quitting at younger ages today than in the past.   
A study by John Pierce and Elizabeth Gilpin estimates the median 
cessation age of successive cohorts of smokers.53  (The median cessation 
age is the age by which 50% of smokers from a particular cohort quit 
smoking.54)  The estimated median cessation age for smokers born between 
1900 and 1904 is age 66 for white males and age 70 for white females.55  
By contrast, the estimated median cessation age for smokers born between 
1975 and 1979 is age 33 for white males and age 36 for white females.56  In 
other words, as many as half of smokers born between 1975 and 1979 will 
quit smoking by their mid-30s.57   
This is important because according to a Surgeon General’s report on 
the benefits of smoking cessation, “[a]fter 10 to 15 years of abstinence, the 
risk of all-cause mortality returns nearly to that of persons who never 
smoked.”58  Similarly, a recent study finds that “[m]ost of the excess 
mortality from smoking could be avoided by quitting smoking at age 35 
years.” 59   
Moreover, early quitting does not simply lead to more years lived in a 
poor state of health.  Rather, it results in additional years of healthy life.60  
After fifteen years of abstinence, former smokers have the same number of 
healthy years remaining as never smokers.61   
So it appears that many smokers smoke while they are young and then 
quit before smoking significantly reduces their life expectancy.  Moreover, 
among those who do not quit in their mid-30s, many quit in middle age, 
which allows them to avoid much of the health damage they would 
                                                                                                                            
1990 SURGEON GENERAL’S REPORT].    
51 Taylor et al., supra note 50, at 994; 1990 SURGEON GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 50, at vi–vii, 8. 
52 John P. Pierce & Elizabeth Gilpin, How Long Will Today’s New Adolescent Smoker Be Addicted to 
Cigarettes?, 86 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 253, 253–54 (1996).   
53 Id. at 253–54.  
54 See id. at 253–54. 
55 Id. at 254. 
56 Id. at 253–54. 
57 Compare the findings of Philip DeCicca and his colleagues, who use longitudinal data that allow them to 
track the smoking status of a large sample of people from 1992, when most of the sample members were high 
school seniors, to 2000, when most of the sample members were around 26-years old.  Philip DeCicca et al., 
Cigarette Taxes and the Transition from Youth to Adult Smoking: Smoking Initiation, Cessation, and 
Participation, 27 J. HEALTH ECON. 904, 904 (2008) [hereinafter DeCicca et al., Transition].  They find that of 
those who were smokers in 1992, 34% had quit by 2000.  Id. at 911. 
58 1990 SURGEON GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 50, at 9. 
59 Taylor et al., supra note 50, at 994.   
60 Truls Ostbye & Donald Taylor, The Effects of Smoking on Years of Healthy Life Lost Among Middle-Aged 
and Older Americans, 39 HEALTH SERVICES RESEARCH 531, 354 (2004). 
61 Id. 
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otherwise sustain.62  Again, early quitting is consistent with rational, 
forward-looking decision making. 
 
3. Differences in the Subjective Price of Smoking 
  
The claim that smoking is a rational choice also finds support in 
evidence that the subjective price of smoking (which includes non-
pecuniary costs specific to the individual) is less for smokers than for 
nonsmokers.  If so, then smokers might rationally find smoking more 
attractive than do nonsmokers, which could explain why some people 
smoke and others do not. 
 
a. Preference Heterogeneity 
 
One reason that the subjective price of smoking may vary is preference 
heterogeneity.  Smokers may have preferences that cause them to conclude 
that the nonmonetary costs of smoking are less than they appear to 
nonsmokers.63 
First, smokers may value health and longevity less than nonsmokers.  A 
recent study finds that smokers place substantially less value than do 
nonsmokers on the non-pecuniary costs, e.g., health and inconvenience 
costs, associated with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD).64  
COPD is a highly debilitating disease that can be caused by smoking, but 
that also has other causes, e.g., exposure to chemicals and outdoor 
pollution.65  The study finds that smokers would be less willing than 
nonsmokers to pay a higher cost of living in order to live in a less polluted 
area where the risk of COPD is lower.66  Also, smokers would be less 
willing to undergo surgery to cure COPD if the surgery posed a risk of 
death.67  These findings suggest that smokers are more willing than 
nonsmokers to cope with COPD and other smoking-related illnesses, which 
would reduce the subjective health costs of smoking.68   
                                                 
62 Pierce & Gilpin, supra note 52, at 254; SLOAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 79 (“Virtually all the excess 
mortality from smoking could be avoided by quitting smoking at age 35, and most of it by stopping smoking in 
middle age.”). 
63 See, e.g., VISCUSI, RISKY DECISION, supra note 12, at 109–10. 
64 Ahmed Khwaja et al., Do Smokers Value Their Health and Longevity Less?, 52 J. LAW & ECON. 171, 191 
(2009) [hereinafter Khwaja et al., Health and Longevity]; but see Ahmed Khwaja et al., Evidence of Preferences 
and Subjective Beliefs of Risk Takers; The Case of Smokers, 24 INT’L J. INDUSTRIAL ORG. 667, 678–81 (2006) 
(noting that answers did not vary by smoking status in a survey asking respondents to choose how much they 
would be willing to pay to have guaranteed perfect health for 10 years, for a pill that was completely effective at 
preventing Alzheimer’s disease, and for a pill that was completely effective at preventing cancer). 
65 Khwaja et al., Health and Longevity, supra note 64, at 171–73. 
66 Id. at 174–77. 
67 Id. at 177–80. 
68 Id. at 191.  Khwaja considers the possibility that causality runs in the other direction, i.e., smoking causes 
smokers to place a lower value on health.  Id. at 192.  He suggests that this is not the case.  Id. at 192.  First, many 
older smokers quit for health reasons so that every smoker could not have convinced herself that good health is 
10
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Consistent with these findings are several studies that show that 
smokers demand a much smaller wage premium in exchange for 
undertaking employment that exposes them to a high risk of injury.69  If 
smokers place less value on health and longevity than do nonsmokers, they 
should require less compensation for risking injury at work.  And that is 
exactly what the evidence indicates.70 
Second, smokers may discount the future at a higher rate than 
nonsmokers.  Those with high (impatient) discount rates should find 
smoking more attractive because they would place a lower present value on 
the associated health costs, the most serious of which generally occur late in 
life.71  But the evidence on this point is mixed.  Some studies surprisingly 
find either no relationship between smoking and discount rates or find that 
smokers have lower discount rates than nonsmokers.72   
But other studies reach different conclusions.73  For example, Robert 
Scharff and W. Kip Viscusi use data on wages and job fatality risks to 
estimate discount rates for smokers and nonsmokers implicit in decisions 
regarding risky employment.74  They find that even after controlling for 
confounding variables, smokers’ occupational choices suggest that they 
have substantially higher discount rates than nonsmokers.75  In other words, 
even in areas of life unrelated to smoking, smokers place less weight on 
future costs.  A broad pattern among smokers of discounting the future at a 
higher rate than nonsmokers could reflect differences in tastes, rather than 
merely irrational myopia among smokers with respect to the smoking 
decision.   
Third, smokers may generally have greater tolerance for risk than do 
                                                                                                                            
not valuable.  Id. at 192.  Second, several studies show that smokers are overly pessimistic about their future 
health.  Id. at 192–93.  Khwaja also points out that even if smoking changes attitudes toward health, it is not clear 
why policy makers should ignore the stated preferences of adult smokers, once those preferences have formed.  Id. 
at 193. 
69 Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Smoking and Other Risky Behaviors, 28 J. DRUG ISSUES 645, 657–59 
(1998) [hereinafter Hersch & Viscusi, Smoking]; Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Cigarette Smoking, Seatbelt Use, 
and Differences in Wage-Risk Tradeoffs, 25 J. HUMAN RESOURCES 202, 225 (1990) [Hersch & Viscusi, Wage-
Risk Tradeoffs]. 
70 See VISCUSI, RISKY DECISION, supra note 12, at 109–15.   
71 Robert L. Scharff & W. Kip Viscusi, Heterogeneous Rates of Time Preference and the Decision to Smoke 
19–20 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 08-31, 2008) (“Given the latency period 
before many of the most severe smoking risks are manifested, people with greater individual rates of time 
preference will be influenced less by the discounted value of the health losses and will be more likely to be 
smokers.”); SLOAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 16 (“[M]ost adverse health effects from smoking, including excess 
mortality, occurs [sic] after age 50.”) 
72 E.g., Harrell Chesson & W. Kip Viscusi, The Heterogeneity of Time-Risk Tradeoffs, 13 J. BEHAVIORAL 
DECISION MAKING 251, 251 (2000); Khwaja	  et	  al.,	  Time	  Preference,	  supra	  note	  37,	  at	  927.	  	   
73 Scharff & Viscusi, supra note 71, at 19–20; Harrison et al., Individual Discount Rates and Smoking: 
Evidence from a Field Experiment in Denmark, 29 J. HEALTH ECON. 708, 717 (2010) (finding that among Danish 
adults, male smokers have a higher discount rate than male nonsmokers, but failing to rule out the possibility that 
female smokers have the same discount rate as female nonsmokers).   
74 Scharff & Viscusi, supra note 71, at 19–20. 
75 Id. at 19–20. 
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nonsmokers, even regarding risks not directly related to smoking.76  A 
penchant for risky behavior may simply be a function of the two 
preferences previously discussed.  If smokers value health and longevity 
less and have a higher discount rate than nonsmokers, then they would be 
more likely to take risks across many domains, given that risk taking often 
involves trading off the possibility of injury or future health damage in 
exchange for current rewards.77  But another possibility is that tolerance for 
risk is a distinct characteristic that generally influences behavior.78  Either 
way, if smokers are generally prone to greater risk taking, that suggests a 
lower subjective price of smoking. 
A growing body of research suggests that smokers take more risks than 
nonsmokers and that this greater risk taking reflects a broad pattern of 
behavior not limited to the decision to smoke.79  Even after controlling for 
age, education, and other demographic characteristics, smokers are less 
likely to take precautions against health risks, specifically by refusing to 
wear a seat belt, to floss, or to regularly check their blood pressure.80  
Smokers are also more likely to report that they take more risks than the 
average person.81  Even after controlling for demographic characteristics, 
smokers are more likely to work in industries in which the risk of injury is 
high.82  Additionally, as already noted, smokers demand less of a wage 
premium than nonsmokers for undertaking risky employment.83  And even 
after controlling for industry risk, smokers are more likely to get injured on 
the job.84  Smokers are also more likely to get injured at home, which again 
suggests a high degree of risk taking.85 
 
b. Differences in Risk Perceptions 
 
A second reason that the subjective price of smoking may vary is that 
smokers’ perceptions of the risks of smoking may be lower than those of 
nonsmokers.86  As discussed below, many people, including smokers, 
                                                 
76 Jahn K. Hakes & W. Kip Viscusi, Automobile Seatbelt Usage and the Value of a Statistical Life, 73 S. 
ECON. J. 659, 670 (2007); Hersch & Viscusi, Smoking, supra note 69, at 659; Robert B. Barsky et al., Preference 
Parameters and Behavioral Heterogeneity: An Experimental Approach in the Health and Retirement Study, 112 
Q.J. ECON. 537, 551–54 (1997); Hersch & Viscusi, Wage-Risk Tradeoffs, supra note 69, at 225. 
77 Hersch & Viscusi, Smoking, supra note 69, at 648. 
78 Barsky et al., supra note 76, at 550–51. 
79 See sources cited supra note 76. 
80 Hakes & Viscusi, supra note 76, at 670; Hersch & Viscusi, Smoking, supra note 69, at 659.    
81 Hersch & Viscusi, Smoking, supra note 69, at 653; see also Barsky et al., supra note 76, at 551–54 (using 
survey questions to measure risk tolerance and finding that smokers are more risk tolerant than nonsmokers); 
Ahmed Khwaja et al., Evidence on Preferences and Subjective Beliefs of Risk Takers: The Case of Smokers, 24 
INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 667, p. 673, 676–78 (2006) (same). 
82 Hersch & Viscusi, Smoking, supra note 69, at 653–57. 
83 Id. at 657–59; Hersch & Viscusi, Wage-Risk Tradeoffs, supra note 69, at 225.     
84 Hersch & Viscusi, Smoking, supra note 69, at 659. 
85 Id. 
86 W. Kip Viscusi & Jahn K. Hakes, Risk Beliefs and Smoking Behavior, 46 ECON. INQUIRY 45, 53–58 
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substantially overestimate the health risks associated with smoking.87  But 
smokers’ estimates generally are somewhat lower (i.e., closer to accurate) 
than those of former and never smokers.88  Lower risk beliefs reduce the 
perceived costs of smoking. 
 
 
c. Differences in Life Lost 
 
A third reason that the subjective price of smoking may vary is that the 
years of life lost due to smoking may vary.  Jerome Adda and Valerie 
Lechene find that people who are otherwise healthy have more to lose by 
smoking than people who would have poor health even if they did not 
smoke.89   
Adda and Lechene separate smokers into two groups.90  The first group 
consists of those who, if they did not smoke, would be in relatively good 
health because they do not suffer from illnesses unrelated to smoking.  The 
second group consists of those who would have relatively poor health even 
if they did not smoke because they suffer from illnesses that are not 
smoking related.  Adda and Lechene find that on average, smokers in the 
first group (the otherwise healthy smokers) lose 1.5 more years of life than 
smokers in the second group (the otherwise unhealthy smokers) as a result 
of smoking.91   
Importantly, the difference in years of life lost appears to influence who 
decides to smoke.  Adda and Lechene find that people who would not be 
healthy even if they did not smoke are more likely to smoke.  They are also 
more likely to smoke heavily and are less likely to quit.92  These findings 
make sense if people who are otherwise in poor health are attracted to 
smoking because they have less to lose in terms of years of life than those 
who are otherwise healthy.93   
 
B.  The Role of Cigarette Taxes if Smoking is a Rational Choice 
 
The theory of rational addiction has important implications for 
                                                                                                                            
(2008); VISCUSI, RISKY DECISION, supra note 12, at 78. 
87 See infra Part I.B.3. 
88 Viscusi & Hakes, supra note 86, at 53–58; VISCUSI, RISKY DECISION, supra note 12, at 78. 
89 Jerome Adda & Valerie Lechene, On the Identification of the Effect of Smoking on Mortality, Working 
Paper 34 (Ctr. for Microdata Methods & Practice, Working Paper 13/04, 2004). 
90 Id. at 21. 
91 Id. at 32 (“Poor health smokers lose on average 3 years, as compared to poor health non smokers, and 5.5 
years if they are poor health heavy smokers. For individuals whose health is good independently from smoking, 
the losses are greater: 4.5 years from being a smoker, and 6.8 from being a heavy smoker. The loss from smoking 
is greater for individuals whose life expectancy is greater if they do not smoke.”). 
92 Id. at 23–30. 
93 See id. at 38. 
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government regulation of smoking.  In particular, if smoking is a rational 
choice, cigarette tax policy should be based on raising revenue and forcing 
smokers to internalize smoking’s external costs.  Rational addiction theory 
does not suggest a role for paternalistic taxes.94   If smokers are rationally 
maximizing their utility, using taxes to reduce smoking adversely affects 
their welfare. 
This begs the question: does the need to raise revenue and internalize 
external costs justify high cigarette taxes?  Subsections 1 and 2 suggest that 
the answer to this question may be no, in which case paternalism takes 
center stage in the debate over cigarette tax increases.  Subsection 3 
contains a brief note on information failures. 
 
1. Raising Revenue 
 
Antismoking advocates often cite the need to raise revenue in support of 
proposals for higher cigarette taxes.95  Even if smoking is a rational choice, 
cigarette taxes might be justified if they are an efficient and fair way to fund 
government.   
With respect to efficiency, tax policy scholars generally accept the 
Ramsey rule.  This rule states that commodity taxes (of which cigarette 
taxes are an example) should vary inversely with the price elasticity of 
demand for products.96  The idea is that if a tax causes consumers to 
significantly reduce consumption of the taxed good, then the tax is 
inefficient.  It distorts behavior, creating an excess burden, without 
producing much revenue.  To minimize distortions, the government should 
tax inelastic goods more heavily.97   
As noted above, many estimates place the price elasticity of cigarettes 
between -0.3 and -0.5.  This means that although the demand for cigarettes 
is not extremely price sensitive, it may not be less price sensitive than the 
demand for many other products, including chicken, apples, theatre and 
opera, legal services, and automobile repair.98  Smokers and potential 
smokers respond to higher taxes by quitting, cutting back, or never starting, 
which reduces the revenue raised.  As a result, cigarettes would not top the 
list of products to be taxed if the goal is to minimize distortions.99 
                                                 
94 Gruber, supra note 18, at 120; Gruber & Koszegi, Is Addiction Rational?, supra note 12, at 1285 (“A key 
implication of the rational addiction framework for modeling addiction is that government regulatory policy 
toward addictive goods should depend only on their interpersonal externalities.”). 
95 E.g., CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, FEDERAL TOBACCO TAXES: A WIN-WIN-WIN SOLUTION, 
available at http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/what_we_do/federal_issues/federal_tobacco_taxes. 
96 HARVEY S. ROSEN & TED GUYER, PUBLIC FINANCE 354–57 (8th ed., 2008).  This ignores the issue of 
external costs, which is addressed in the text infra Part I.B.2.  
97 Id. at 357. 
98 W. Kip Viscusi, Principles of Cigarette Taxation 72–73, in EXCISE TAX POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION IN 
SOUTH AFRICAN COUNTRIES (Sijbren Cnossen ed., 2006) [hereinafter, Viscusi, Principles]. 
99 Id. at 73. 
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Even if they were efficient, cigarette taxes are arguably unfair.  Tax 
scholars often cite two competing views when discussing tax equity—the 
benefit principle and the ability-to-pay principle.100  According to the 
benefit principle, taxation should be based on benefits received from the 
government.101  In other words, taxes are like user fees and those receiving 
greater services should pay higher fees.  Applying this principle, smokers 
should not bear a larger tax burden than nonsmokers unless they receive 
more benefits from government.  As discussed in subsection 2, it is not clear 
that the additional government benefits that smokers receive (e.g., in the 
form of government-financed health care) justify the current level of 
cigarette taxes.   
Those who accept the ability-to-pay principle, on the other hand, argue 
that taxation should be based on ability to pay, which is generally thought to 
increase with income.102  Contrary to this principle, cigarette taxes are very 
regressive, imposing a substantial and disproportionate burden on low-
income smokers and their families.103   
 
2. Internalizing External Costs 
 
The social costs of smoking include the private costs to the smoker and 
the external costs to everyone else, i.e., smoking’s negative externalities.  
Most of the costs of smoking are private.104  Nonetheless, smokers do 
impose costs on others.  These costs include smoking-related medical 
expenses paid for by nonsmokers and health damage caused by 
environmental tobacco smoke (ETS).  If smokers ignore smoking’s external 
costs, then (even assuming smokers are rational) they will smoke more than 
the socially optimal amount.  Cigarette taxes can potentially correct this 
problem by forcing smokers to internalize external costs.  In theory, the 
optimal corrective tax equals the external cost per pack.105 
Economists have studied smoking’s externalities extensively over the 
past twenty-five years.  Surprisingly, several studies conclude that the net 
external costs of smoking are not large.106  In fact, Jonathan Gruber, an 
economist who supports higher cigarette taxes on paternalistic grounds, 
concedes that “there is a fairly strong consensus [among economists] that 
the net externalities are small, on the order of forty cents per pack or 
                                                 
100 E.g., JOEL SLEMROD & JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES 62–66 (4th ed., 2008). 
101 Id. at 62. 
102 Id. at 64–66. 
103 See infra Part IV.D. 
104 SLOAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 251–56. 
105 For a discussion of these issues, see Viscusi, Principles, supra note 98, at 73–77. 
106 W. KIP VISCUSI, SMOKE-FILLED ROOMS: A POSTMORTEM ON THE TOBACCO DEAL 73 (2002) [hereinafter, 
VISCUSI, SMOKE-FILLED ROOMS]; Willard. G. Manning et al., The Taxes of Sin: Do Smokers and Drinkers Pay 
Their Way?, 261 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1604, 1604–09 (1989); Willard G. Manning et al., THE COSTS OF POOR 
HEALTH HABITS 62–85 (1991); Viscusi, Social Consequences, supra note 2, at 92–93. 
15
Lucas: SAVING SMOKERS FROM THEMSELVES: THE PATERNALISTIC USE OF CIGARETT
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2012
16 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
less.”107  There are three primary reasons for this. 
The first reason is that the externality associated with smokers’ medical 
expenses is not very large.108  It is true that nonsmokers will pay part of the 
cost of smokers’ medical treatment if private health insurers do not base 
premiums on smoking status or if the treatment is paid for by government 
programs (particularly Medicaid and Medicare).  But many smokers quit 
early in life and avoid serious health problems.109  In addition, while 
inveterate smokers use more health care resources earlier in life, they also 
die sooner, which significantly reduces medical expenses during old age 
and saves money on the Medicare program.110  Premature death also 
reduces the external costs associated with nursing home care.111  
The second reason is that smoking actually benefits nonsmokers through 
its effects on Social Security and private pensions.112  Smokers contribute to 
Social Security during their working lives, but because they have a shorter 
life span, they receive substantially fewer benefits than nonsmokers.113  
Similarly, smokers receive fewer benefits from private employers’ defined 
benefit pension plans, which in many respects operate like Social 
Security.114  As a result, smoking actually saves money for Social Security 
and defined benefit plans, resulting in a subsidy to nonsmokers.115  This 
substantially offsets the external costs of smoking and reduces the need for 
any corrective tax. 
Accounting for pension and medical savings due to premature death is 
generally accepted by economists, but has generated significant controversy 
outside the economics profession.116  Some argue that acknowledging these 
savings is immoral and implies that smokers’ premature deaths are socially 
desirable.117  The problem with this position is that many antismoking 
advocates claim that smokers are not paying their own way.  This claim 
necessitates calculating smoking’s external costs.  Including the savings to 
government due to smokers’ premature deaths is simply a necessary step in 
the calculation.118  Government economist Jane Gravelle defends the 
practice as follows:  
 
The fact of savings from government transfers due to premature 
                                                 
107 Gruber, supra note 18, at 120. 
108 E.g., VISCUSI, SMOKE-FILLED ROOMS, supra note 106, at 73. 
109 Kenneth Warner et al., Criteria for Determining an Optimal Cigarette Tax: An Economist’s Perspective, 
4 TOBACCO CONTROL 380, 382 (1995). 
110 VISCUSI, SMOKE-FILLED ROOMS, supra note 106, at 67–68, 73. 
111 Id. at 73–74. 
112 Id. at 73–74. 
113  Viscusi, Social Consequences, supra note 2, at 72. 
114 Id.  
115 VISCUSI, SMOKE-FILLED ROOMS, supra note 106, at 73. 
116 E.g., Hanson & Logue, supra note 17, at 1255–60. 
117 Id. at 1255–60. 
118 E.g., Viscusi, Social Consequences, supra note 2, at 72. 
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death does not imply that there is a social gain from premature death; 
there is clearly a loss that accrues to the smoker who is part of 
society.  Nevertheless, in a straight-forward accounting for costs, the 
government in its role as provider of certain services will experience 
financial savings from premature death, which must be considered in 
determining how different parties fare because of smoking.  This 
observation does not mean that it is desirable that people die early; 
rather it means that in compensating relevant parties financially, if 
that is the justification for a payment, a correct measure of the loss 
will only be calculated if the effects of premature death are taken 
into account.119  
 
The third reason that smoking’s external costs may be low is that the 
externality associated with ETS is arguably small.  A number of studies find 
that prolonged exposure to ETS increases the risk of various illnesses, 
including lung cancer and heart disease.120  But a strong case can be made 
that most of the effects of ETS should be ignored for purposes of cigarette 
tax policy.  Restrictions on smoking in enclosed spaces are now common in 
the United States, and they substantially reduce prolonged, involuntary ETS 
exposure for those who do not live with smokers.121  Moreover, these 
restrictions better target the ETS externality than cigarette taxes, which 
affect even those who smoke in isolation.122 
What about exposure to ETS within smokers’ households?  Since 
smokers care about their families, they may take these costs into account in 
deciding whether to smoke.123  And as the dangers of ETS have become 
better known, smokers often take steps to protect their spouses and children, 
e.g., by quitting or by not smoking in the house or car.124   
Additionally, household costs may be internalized via explicit or 
implicit bargaining.125  For example, spouses may agree that if the smoking 
spouse continues to smoke, the nonsmoking spouse may treat himself or 
herself to certain indulgences.  In the extreme case, the nonsmoking spouse 
may threaten divorce.  This type of argument is less convincing with respect 
to costs imposed on children, who are not in a good position to bargain for 
themselves.126  But most of the costs of ETS are imposed on the smoker’s 
                                                 
119 JANE GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-1053 E, THE PROPOSED TOBACCO SETTLEMENT: WHO 
PAYS FOR THE HEALTH COSTS OF SMOKING? 3 (1998). 
120 See SLOAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 223–31 (reviewing the literature); VISCUSI, SMOKE-FILLED ROOMS, 
supra note 106, at 104–21 (same). 
121 See VISCUSI, SMOKE-FILLED ROOMS, supra note 106, at 101. 
122 Viscusi, Principles, supra note 98, at 82. 
123 SLOAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 219–21. 
124 See, e.g., Viscusi & Hakes, supra note 86, at 55–57 (finding that married smokers are more likely to 
quit); Viscusi, Principles, supra note 98, at 82. 
125 SLOAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 219–21. 
126 See SLOAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 219–21; Warner et al., supra note 109, at 383 (“Although most 
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spouse,127 and a strong case exists for treating these costs as private. 
Largely because of the three reasons just cited, several economic studies 
estimate the net external costs of smoking at significantly less than the 
current nationwide average tax of $2.18 per pack.128    As already noted, 
these estimates are somewhat controversial, but my goal is not to resolve 
the controversy.  Rather, my point is simply that a strong case can be made 
that externalities do not justify further cigarette tax increases.  If that is true, 
then advocates of higher cigarette taxes must rely on paternalism.   
 
3. Note on Information Failures 
 
A person contemplating smoking (or quitting smoking) must be well 
informed in order to make a rational decision.  This does not mean that she 
must be omniscient.  Out of necessity, she faces the uncertainties associated 
with smoking, e.g., the risk of lung cancer.  But a rational person will 
accurately perceive these risks given the information available.   
So even if smokers are otherwise rational, it is crucial that they have 
accurate information about smoking.  For example, if smokers 
underestimate the health risks involved, they might choose to smoke even 
though they would not do so if they had better information.  In that case, 
government intervention might be warranted. 
Do smokers underestimate the health risks?  The evidence is somewhat 
mixed, but for most smokers, the answer is no.  W. Kip Viscusi has 
conducted several surveys that find that the average smoker overestimates 
the risk of lung cancer, the overall risk of dying from all smoking-related 
causes, and the number of years of life lost due to smoking.129  Viscusi’s 
                                                                                                                            
economists would accept treatment of the health of spouses as an internal cost, many would be reluctant to apply 
it universally to fetuses and children.”) 
127 SLOAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 254. 
128 See sources cited supra note 106.  In a recent book-length discussion of the social costs of smoking, 
Frank Sloan and his colleagues conclude that the external costs are $2.20 per pack (stated in 2000 dollars and 
ignoring the costs to smokers’ families).  SLOAN ET AL., supra note 41, at 255.  But this figure arguably exceeds 
the optimal corrective tax.  Among other issues, the figure is based largely on the externality stemming from the 
cross-subsidization of life insurance premiums.  See id.  If life insurance companies fail to impose a surcharge on 
smokers, then nonsmokers will subsidize smokers’ life insurance via higher premium payments.  Id. at 181–84.  
Sloan finds that this subsidy is large, amounting to $1.78 per pack.  Id. at 255.  Yet he expresses reservations with 
the conclusion that cigarette taxes should reflect this figure.  Id. at 193–94, 256.  He notes that this finding is 
based on historical data, which may reflect life insurers’ traditional practice of not basing premiums on smoking 
status.  Id. at 194.  Surcharging has become increasingly common, so cross-subsidies in the life insurance market 
may be “an artifact of our history.”  Id. at 193.  And even if surcharging were not common, increased cigarette 
taxes would not be the best response.  Id. at 280 n.6.  A better-targeted solution (assuming any problem exists) 
would simply be to require surcharging.  Id. at 193.   
129 Viscusi & Hakes, supra note 86, at 47–49; VISCUSI, RISKY DECISION, supra note 12, at 68–79.  Viscusi 
estimates the true lung cancer risk level at 6%–13%, while the mean risk level perceived by smokers in his 1997 
national survey was 40%.  Viscusi & Hakes, supra note 86, at 47–48.  Similarly, Viscusi estimates the true total 
smoking mortality risk level at 13%–36%, while the mean risk level perceived by smokers in the 1997 survey was 
44%.  Id. at 48.  Viscusi estimates the true life-expectancy loss at 3.6 to 8 years, while smokers in the 1997 survey 
estimated the loss at 10.2 years.  Id. at 48–49.  The results of Viscusi’s other surveys are similar.  Id. at 47–49; 
VISCUSI, RISKY DECISION, supra note 12, at 68–79. 
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findings are consistent with evidence that people tend to overestimate 
highly publicized risks.130   
Interestingly, Viscusi also finds that less-educated people have higher 
risk beliefs than better-educated people, and blue-collar workers have 
higher risk beliefs than white-collar workers.131  In other words, those 
whom we might expect to be ill-informed about smoking do in fact perceive 
the risks less accurately.  But in this case, that means that they are more 
prone toward overestimating those risks.  This finding conflicts with the 
theory that the higher smoking rate among the poor results from failure to 
appreciate the risks involved.132   
In contrast to Viscusi, Michael Schoenbaum finds that some smokers 
underestimate their risk of premature death.133  Specifically, Schoenbaum 
asked people ranging from ages 50 to 62 to estimate their chances of 
surviving to age 75.134  He then compared these estimates to actuarial 
predictions.  The predictions of smokers, former smokers, and light smokers 
were quite accurate.135  But heavy smokers (more than twenty-five 
cigarettes daily) overestimated their survival chances.136   
Paternalists frequently cite this finding,137 but it is important to keep it 
in perspective.  Even Schoenbaum finds that older smokers who are light 
smokers (68% of the smokers in his sample) either accurately estimate or 
overestimate the risk of premature death.138  Moreover, a more recent study 
of older smokers by Ahmed Khwaja and his colleagues finds that smokers 
are “quite accurate on average about the probability of surviving to age 
75.”139  Khwaja concludes that “[t]he lack of association between smoking 
and optimism in risk perceptions casts doubt on the idea that continued 
smoking can be attributed to a rosy view of future risks.” 
Additionally, even if we accept Schoenbaum’s study at face value, 
cigarette taxes are not the best tool for correcting inaccurate risk 
perceptions.  Taxes are overbroad in that they reduce smoking even among 
                                                 
130 VISCUSI, RISKY DECISION, supra note 12, at 70; BARUCH FISCHHOFF ET AL., ACCEPTABLE RISK 29 
(1981). 
131 Viscusi & Hakes, supra note 86, at 51–52. 
132 Id. at 52. 
133 Michael Schoenbaum, Do Smokers Understand the Mortality Effects of Smoking?, 87 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 755, 757 (1997). 
134 Id. at 756. 
135 Id. at 757. 
136 Id. 
137 E.g., Hanson & Logue, supra note 17, at 1187–88. 
138 See Schoenbaum, supra note 133, at 757; Goldfarb et al., supra note 38, at 237 (making the same point 
about Schoenbaum’s findings).     
139 Ahmed Khwaja et al., Are Mature Smokers Misinformed?, 28 J. HEALTH ECON. 385, 396 (2009) 
[hereinafter Khwaja et al., Mature Smokers].  Despite accurately perceiving their chances of survival, older 
smokers substantially overestimate the risk of smoking-related illnesses.  Id.  In an earlier study using different 
data, Khwaja and his colleagues found that in general, smokers are overly optimistic in their assessment of their 
mortality.  Ahmed Khwaja et al., The Relationship between Individual Expectations and Behaviors: Mortality 
Expectations and Smoking Decisions, 35 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 179, 197 (2007). 
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those who are well informed.  A better-targeted approach is to collect and 
disseminate accurate information, including information about the benefits 
of quitting. 
To summarize, a rational smoker decides whether to smoke in an 
informed and forward-looking manner, weighing the costs and benefits, 
including the risk of addiction and premature death.  Substantial evidence 
supports the claim that smoking may be a rational choice.  If it is, cigarette 
taxes arguably should not be increased above their current level. 
  
II.  EVIDENCE THAT PURPORTEDLY SHOWS THAT SMOKING IS NOT A 
RATIONAL CHOICE  
 
Part I presents evidence consistent with the claim that smoking is a 
rational choice.  This Part describes facts that, according to paternalists, 
contradict this claim.  This evidence has motivated the development of 
alternative theories of smoking that are often used to justify paternalistic 
regulation. 
 
A.  Failed Quit Attempts and Commitment Devices 
 
That many people quit smoking does not by itself imply that the 
decision to start is irrational.  Given that quitting can significantly reduce 
the risk of premature death, it could be rational to smoke early in life but to 
stop when the health benefits of quitting outweigh the costs in terms of 
forgone pleasure from continuing to smoke.  But the fact that smokers often 
make several failed attempts to quit calls into question the claim that 
smoking is a rational choice.140   
Failed attempts to quit present a problem for the rational addiction 
model because it assumes stable preferences.  The model does not account 
for self-control problems, i.e., the inability of a consumer to carry out the 
consumption plan that she deems best.141  A rational smoker who decides to 
quit would not later change her mind in a moment of weakness.  Moreover, 
addiction by itself would not prevent her from quitting once her plan to do 
so is in place.  She would take addiction into account before deciding to 
quit.  But once she determines that quitting is worth the cost, she would be 
able to suffer through any withdrawal symptoms in order to carry out her 
plan. 
It is possible that smokers are otherwise rational, but they do not possess 
information about the best method or time for quitting.  If so, a particular 
                                                 
140 Over 40% of smokers report having attempted to quit in the past year, and 4%–7% of those attempts are 
successful.  U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., supra note 16, at 15. 
141 See Gruber & Koszegi, Is Addiction Rational?, supra note 12, at 1277–79; Becker & Murphy, supra note 
15, at 675. 
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smoker might have to experiment with several quitting strategies until she 
discovers the one that works for her.142  Or if she fails to quit because an 
unforeseen, stressful event triggers relapse, she may try again when her 
stress level subsides.   
Consistent with this hypothesis, many smokers do eventually succeed in 
quitting, demonstrating that they are not incapacitated by addiction.143  
About half of all Americans who have ever smoked have successfully 
quit.144  But to the extent that some smokers repeatedly fail to quit, that is 
evidence that for them at least, smoking is not a rational choice.   
A related issue is the use of commitment devices by smokers who are 
trying to quit.  Commitment devices can help with quitting by reducing 
temptation or increasing the cost of smoking.145  For example, a smoker 
might avoid keeping cigarettes in her house.  Or she might tell her friends 
and family that she is quitting, knowing that she will be embarrassed if she 
relapses.  Commitment devices like these are easy to explain if smokers are 
aware that they lack self-control.  But these devices are hard to understand 
if smokers are rational.  A rational smoker who decides to quit might take 
steps to reduce the pain of withdrawal, e.g., by using nicotine gum.146  But 
she would have no need to use commitment devices that limit her choices or 
that make relapse more costly.147  Since she has complete self-control, she 
has no reason to fear that she will deviate from her desired plan. 
 
B.  Regret and the Desire to Quit 
 
Smokers often express regret about smoking and claim that they would 
like to quit.148  Paternalists interpret this as evidence that smokers recognize 
that smoking is a mistake.149   
But regret and expressed intentions to quit do not necessarily prove that 
smoking is not a rational choice.   Some smokers may claim that they regret 
smoking and would like to quit, not because they truly do, but because in a 
society that frowns upon smoking, this is what they are expected to say.150  
They may also simply mean that they would prefer it if they could smoke 
                                                 
142 Becker & Murphy, supra note 15, at 693. 
143 See Goldfarb et al., supra note 38, at 236. 
144 CDC, supra note 26, at 10, 85. 
145 For a discussion of the use of commitment devices by smokers, see Gruber & Koszegi, Is Addiction 
Rational?, supra note 12, at 1278. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., supra note 16, at 15 (“Epidemiologic data suggest 
that more than 70 percent of the 45 million smokers in the United States today report that they want to quit, and 
approximately 44 percent report that they try to quit each year.”)	 
149 E.g., Hanson & Logue, supra note 17, at 1193–1209. 
150 W. Kip Viscusi, The New Cigarette Paternalism, 25 REG. 58, 58 (2002) [hereinafter Viscusi, 
Paternalism].   
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without risk.151   
There is evidence that although many smokers want to quit eventually, 
they are not serious about quitting anytime in the near future.  A national 
survey of daily smokers finds that approximately 60% report that they do 
not intend to quit in the next six months.152  And presumably, only a 
fraction of the remaining 40% sincerely plans to quit during that period.  In 
another study, only 41% of smokers expressed interest in taking advantage 
of a smoking cessation clinic.153  More importantly, only about 1% of the 
smokers participating in the study actually followed through and used the 
clinic that was made available to them.154   
This type of evidence is not conclusive.  It could be interpreted to mean 
that although they really want to quit, most smokers have given up on the 
possibility.  But such widespread pessimism would be unwarranted given 
that so many smokers have quit and that cessation medications make 
quitting easier today than in the past.  The more plausible interpretation is 
that despite statements to the contrary, many smokers simply do not want to 
quit. 
Additionally, because smoking is a form of front-loaded consumption 
(i.e., the benefits are realized immediately and the costs occur in the future), 
regret would not be surprising even among rational smokers.  Robert 
Goldfarb and his colleagues explain this point as follows: 
 
If smokers mean “I wish I didn’t smoke,” this is not inconsistent 
with rational choice.  It means only that current choices are 
unpleasant.  The pain of quitting can be seen as part of the cost paid 
for the pleasures enjoyed along the way, analogous to being 
overweight or hung over, or in debt.  One can clearly regret that the 
bill has come due, but this regret does not demonstrate a non-rational 




                                                 
151 VISCUSI, RISKY DECISION, supra note 12, at 120.  Viscusi points out that people often express 
dissatisfaction with some attribute of a particular product or activity.  Id.  For example, nearly a third of blue-
collar workers claim that they would like to leave their jobs.  Id.  Their failure to actually quit does not prove 
irrationality.  Cf. Becker & Murphy, supra note 15, at 693 (stating that the claims of smokers that they want to 
quit are “no different from the claims of single persons that they want to but are unable to marry or from the 
claims of disorganized persons that they want to become better organized”). 
152 Mary Ellen Wewers et al., Distribution of Daily Smokers by Stage of Change: Current Population Survey 
Results, 36 PREVENTATIVE MED. 710, 714 (2003).  Only 15% of smokers plan to quit in the next 30 days.  
Gregory Colman & Dahlia Remler, Vertical Equity Consequences of Very High Cigarette Tax Increases: If the 
Poor Are the Ones Smoking, How Could Cigarette Tax Increases Be Progressive?, 27 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & 
MGMT. 376, 396 (2008). 
153 Viscusi, Paternalism, supra note 150, at 58.   
154 Id. 
155 Goldfarb et al., supra note 38, at 235. 
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III. INCAPACITATION AND PATERNALISTIC TAXES 
 
By calling into question the claim that smoking is a rational choice, the 
evidence presented in Part II suggests a potential role for paternalism.  This 
Part and Part IV discuss alternative theories of smoking and whether those 
theories justify paternalistic cigarette taxes.  This Part addresses the theory 
that smoking results from incapacitation.  
Some doctors and public health advocates believe that once addicted, 
smokers do not choose to smoke but are instead incapacitated by addiction, 
which is sometimes viewed as a disease.156  If smoking results from 
incapacitation, then arguably, the government should try to eliminate it, and 
cigarette taxes might assist in this effort. 
But there are reasons to believe that incapacitation does not explain all 
or even most smoking behavior.  While quitting is difficult, about half of all 
Americans who have ever smoked (tens of millions of people) have 
succeeded in doing it.157  In fact, antismoking advocates often argue that 
increasing cigarette taxes causes smokers to quit,158 a position that is 
inconsistent with incapacitation.  Moreover, as discussed in Part I, smokers 
are now quitting much earlier in life than they did in the past, a 
development likely attributable to better information about the benefits of 
quitting.  Again, this suggests that many smokers are not incapacitated by 
addiction and can quit if they wish to do so. 
In addition, even if we assume that some smokers are incapacitated by 
addiction, it is not clear that cigarette taxes are an appropriate response.  To 
the extent that smokers cannot quit, the taxes effectively punish them for 
their dependence, which raises fairness concerns.159  These concerns are 
especially serious given that smokers are disproportionately poor so that 
cigarette taxes impose a heavy financial burden on them.160   
                                                 
156 See sources cited supra note 16. 
157 CDC, supra note 26, at 10, 85. 
158 CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, INCREASING THE FEDERAL CIGARETTE TAX REDUCES SMOKING 
(AND THE CIGARETTE COMPANIES KNOW IT) 1–4 (2009). 
159 Cf. Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman, Perspectives on Policy: Introduction, in REGULATING 
TOBACCO 3, 5 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman, eds., 2001) (“[T]he greater weight one attaches to the 
power of addiction, the stronger the equitable argument that tobacco taxation is a form of punishment for those 
who simply cannot quit.”). 
160 Setting aside issues of fairness, whether it would be efficient to impose a tax on smokers who are 
incapacitated by addiction depends on what the government does with the revenue.  Conventional analysis 
assumes that the social cost of taxation stems from the excess burden created when taxpayers alter their behavior 
to avoid the tax.  If a taxpayer does not alter her behavior but chooses instead to simply pay the tax, the tax that 
she pays involves a private cost to her but does not represent a social cost.  The reason is that the government 
(directly or indirectly) transfers the money to other persons.  Simply put, it is not obvious that a social loss occurs 
when the government takes a dollar from A and gives it to B.  (Note however that aggregate welfare would 
decline if the utility that A would have derived from spending the dollar exceeds that derived by B, which might 
be the case, e.g., if B is richer than A.)  According to this view, the tax revenue collected from smokers does not 
represent a social cost, even if the smokers have no choice but to pay it owing to their addiction.  For a discussion 
of the conventional analysis, see ROSEN & GAYER, supra note 96, at 331–38; MANKIW, supra note 13, at 159–72. 
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So for those who take incapacitation seriously, the argument for 
cigarette taxes appears to rest on the belief that they will deter people from 
starting to smoke.  But the evidence for incapacitation is arguably not strong 
enough to justify taking the decision to smoke out of the hands of informed 
adults.  And to the extent that the goal is to prevent children from taking up 
smoking, taxes are a blunt tool.  Better-targeted alternatives exist, including 
raising the minimum age for legal sale of cigarettes to twenty-one, an 
approach considered in more detail in Part V. 
 
IV. IMPERFECT RATIONALITY AND PATERNALISTIC TAXES 
 
As discussed in Part I, the standard approach in economics is to assume 
that consumers behave rationally to maximize their own utility.  So it is not 
surprising that conventional economists and economically oriented legal 
scholars typically emphasize consumer sovereignty and are skeptical of 
paternalism.161  But this skepticism has been questioned in recent years.  A 
number of economists and legal scholars use evidence from psychology and 
behavioral economics to argue that people suffer from self-control 
problems, cognitive limitations, and cognitive biases, all of which can 
prevent rational utility maximization.162  And some argue that these failures 
of rationality drive smoking behavior.163   
Theories based on imperfect rationality differ from the notion that 
smokers are incapacitated by addiction.  The proponents of these theories 
do not deny that smoking is a choice.  They claim instead that the choice is 
flawed.  In that sense, the use of imperfect rationality to explain smoking 
represents a less radical departure from rational addiction theory.  Yet it still 
provides a rationale for paternalism. 
Nevertheless, this Part argues that imperfect rationality does not justify 
paternalistic cigarette taxes.  The primary reason is heterogeneity.  Some 
smokers may smoke because of failures of rationality, but for others, 
smoking appears to be a rational choice.  For example, as discussed in Part 
I, nearly half of modern smokers quit early enough to avoid serious health 
damage, including premature death.164  And given current trends, that figure 
                                                                                                                            
An alternative view has been proposed by public choice scholars.  See, e.g., GORDON TULLOCK, THE 
ECONOMICS OF SPECIAL PRIVILEGE AND RENT SEEKING 11–25, 73–77 (1989).  They argue that government 
spending can involve social costs apart from the excess burden arising from taxpayer attempts to avoid taxes.  One 
reason is resources spent on rent seeking.  Id. at 73–77.  Another is that the government often does not directly 
transfer money from taxpayers to favored groups.  Rather, for political reasons, the transfers frequently must be 
disguised in the form of inefficient projects or subsidies, the costs of which may substantially outweigh the 
benefits.  Id. at 11–25, 76–77.  The end result is that the cost to taxpayers of government transfers may exceed the 
benefit to the recipients of those transfers, which entails a social cost.  
161 E.g., Calcott, supra note 14, at 39–41; STIGLITZ, supra note 14, at 86–88. 
162 See sources cited supra note 18.   
163 Gruber & Koszegi, Is Addiction Rational?, supra note 12, at 1285–86; Hanson & Logue, supra note 17, 
at 1181–1223. 
164 Michel Grignon has noted the importance of this fact to the debate over paternalistic smoking regulations.  
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is likely to increase in the future.165  Many people smoke as young adults 
and then quit before the risk becomes high, which suggests rational 
calculation.  If smokers are in fact heterogeneous, then the government must 
trade off the welfare of those who might benefit from paternalistic taxes 
(i.e., those who smoke because they are imperfectly rational) against the 
welfare of those who will be burdened (i.e., those who smoke as a rational 
choice). 
In addition to heterogeneity, government failure creates an obstacle to 
effective paternalistic taxes.  In particular, the government faces important 
information constraints, including a lack of information about the extent to 
which imperfect rationality causes people to smoke.  The government also 
lacks control over smokers’ responses to taxation, which are often harmful 
to the smokers themselves.   
To better explain why heterogeneity and government failure make 
paternalistic taxes undesirable, Sections A and B focus on the model of 
smoking developed by Jonathan Gruber and Botond Koszegi.  Gruber and 
Koszegi argue that smoking is suboptimal because smokers have self-
control problems that prevent them from quitting.166   
I concentrate on the Gruber-Koszegi model because it is well developed 
and is prominent in both the legal and economic literature.  Additionally, 
Gruber and Koszegi have used this model to advocate large cigarette 
taxes.167  But I recognize that other scholars have proposed alternative 
theories of smoking that are based on different failures of rationality.168  
And while the Article does not address all of these theories in detail, the 
problems posed by heterogeneity and government failure are relevant to 
them as well.  To illustrate this point, Section C discusses the claim that 
smoking results from optimism bias among smokers. 
Another significant drawback of paternalistic taxes is their regressivity.  
Even if the taxes benefit some smokers by forcing them to quit, they place a 
substantial burden on the many low-income persons who continue to 
smoke.  Section D elaborates on this point. 
Given the problems with paternalistic taxes, it is beneficial to consider 
alternatives that are more suitable for a heterogeneous population, that pose 
a lower risk of government failure, and that do not burden the poor.  Section 
E discusses several products and policies that meet these criteria. 
 
                                                                                                                            
Michel Grignon, An Empirical Investigation of Heterogeneity in Time Preferences and Smoking Behaviors, 38 J. 
SOCIO-ECON. 739, 739–40 (2009). 
165 Pierce & Gilpin, supra note 52, at 253–54. 
166 Gruber & Koszegi, Is Addiction Rational?, supra note 12, at 1285–94. 
167 GRUBER & KOSZEGI, MODERN VIEW, supra note 18, at 17 (noting that the optimal cigarette tax could be 
as high as $14 per pack). 
168 For a discussion of several of these theories, see Hanson & Logue, supra note 17, at 1186–1209. 
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A.  The Gruber-Koszegi Self-Control Tax 
 
A rational smoker has no problem with self-control.  In other words, she 
carries out her desired consumption plan without difficulty.  So if she 
decides to quit smoking, she is able to do so, her addiction notwithstanding.   
But as discussed in Part II, smokers sometimes have trouble quitting and 
seek the aid of commitment devices that make smoking difficult or 
expensive.  These devices are hard to explain if smokers are rational but 
make sense for smokers who lack sufficient self-control to quit without 
them. 
In addition to evidence regarding the use of commitment devices, 
several studies support the claim that at least some smokers have self-
control problems.  For example, Joni Hersch finds that smokers who are 
currently trying to quit after having previously failed are more likely to 
support smoking restrictions in public areas than smokers who are trying to 
quit for the first time.169  She interprets this as evidence that smokers who 
have tried unsuccessfully to quit in the past are aware that they lack self-
control and wish to use smoking restrictions as a commitment device that 
reduces their opportunity to smoke.170   
Similarly, Gruber and Sendhil Mullainathan find evidence that higher 
cigarette taxes reduce self-reported unhappiness among those with a 
propensity to smoke.171  Although some scholars question the significance 
of this finding,172 Gruber and Mullainathan emphasize that it is consistent 
with the claim that smokers lack self-control and benefit from commitment 
devices that reduce smoking, including cigarette taxes.173 
Gruber and Koszegi have used this and similar evidence to argue in 
favor of paternalistic cigarette taxes.174  They argue that smokers have time-
inconsistent preferences, which result in self-control problems.175  Simply 
put, a smoker might plan to quit tomorrow, but when tomorrow comes, she 
                                                 
169 Joni Hersch, Smoking Restrictions as a Self-Control Mechanism, 31 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5, 6 (2005).  
For example, based on a series of surveys conducted periodically from 1991–2002, Hersch finds that among daily 
smokers who have tried to quit in the past and who are planning another quit attempt, 24.4% support a ban on 
smoking in restaurants, compared to only 21.4% of those planning to quit for the first time.  Id. at 15.  Controlling 
for demographics and other factors has only a minor effect on this gap.  Id. at 19.   
170 Id. 
171 Jonathan Gruber and Sendhil Mullainathan, Do Cigarette Taxes Make Smokers Happier?, 5 ADVANCES 
ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 1, 2 (2005). 
172 B. Douglas Bernheim, Behavioral Welfare Economics, 26 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper 14622, 2008) (criticizing the claim that self-reported happiness measures internal well-being and 
concluding that Gruber and Mullainathan’s “finding that higher cigarette tax rates lead to greater reported 
happiness among smokers proves nothing about smokers’ well-being”); Faruk Gul & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 
Harmful Addiction, 74 REV. ECON. STUD. 147, 151 (2007) (noting that increases in self-reported happiness after a 
cigarette tax is adopted do not necessarily show that the tax makes smokers better off in lifetime terms because ex 
post happiness does not reflect quitting costs). 
173 Gruber & Mullainathan, supra note 171, at 21–22. 
174 GRUBER & KOSZEGI, MODERN VIEW, supra note 18, at 17; Gruber, supra note 18, at 124–25; Gruber & 
Koszegi, Is Addiction Rational?, supra note 12, at 1292.  
175 Gruber & Koszegi, Is Addiction Rational?, supra note 12, at 1293. 
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changes her mind and continues smoking.  Gruber and Koszegi claim that 
self-control problems result from hyperbolic discounting, which causes 
smokers to be present-biased and to place too little weight on smoking’s 
long-term health consequences.176 
Gruber and Koszegi develop a model of smoking that incorporates 
hyperbolic discounting.177  From that model, they derive a formula for the 
optimal self-control tax on cigarettes.178  Section B discusses the problems 
with using this formula to guide cigarette tax policy.  This Section explains 
the model from which the formula is derived.   
Standard economic models usually assume that people place greater 
weight on the present than the future and that each person has a discount 
factor179 that she uses to discount future costs and benefits.180  For example, 
a person with a discount factor of 0.9 would be indifferent about receiving 
$100 in a year or $90 today.181  Discount factors may vary from person to 
person, reflecting the fact that some people are more patient than others.  
But economists generally treat the discount factor as a matter of individual 
preference and do not treat discounting as irrational.182 
Standard models, including the rational addiction model, also assume 
that people discount exponentially.  Exponential discounting means that a 
single discount factor applies to two equidistant periods no matter how 
close to the present those periods are.183  Exponential discounting results in 
preferences that are consistent over time.  An exponential discounter who 
considers $100 in two years to be equivalent to $90 in one year would also 
consider $100 in a year to be equivalent to $90 today.   
But certain findings in behavioral economics appear inconsistent with 
exponential discounting.  For example, a number of studies have shown that 
if you offer people a choice between $100 in two years and $90 in one year, 
many will choose the former, larger amount, demonstrating patience.184  But 
if you offer a choice between $100 in a year and $90 today, some of those 
same people will choose the latter, smaller amount, demonstrating 
impatience. 
A possible explanation for these disparate results is that people engage 
in hyperbolic rather than exponential discounting.  With hyperbolic 
                                                 
176 Id. at 1279–93. 
177 Id. at 1279–82. 
178 Id. at 1286–89. 
179 The discount rate (r), which may be more familiar to lawyers, is related to the discount factor (δ) as 
follows: r = (1 - δ) / δ.  Rizzo & Whitman, Knowledge Problem, supra note 18, at 913 n.23. 
180 For a discussion of the role of discount factors in standard economic models and models involving 
hyperbolic discounting, see Rizzo & Whitman, Knowledge Problem, supra note 18, at 913–14. 
181 This example is based on the example found in Rizzo & Whitman, Knowledge Problem, supra note 18, at 
913. 
182 Id.; Hersch & Viscusi, Smoking, supra note 69, at 648. 
183 Id. 
184 Shane Frederick et al., Time Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review, 40 J. ECON. LIT. 351, 
360-61 (2002) (discussing these studies). 
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discounting, the discount factor becomes smaller the closer the period in 
question is to the present.185  In other words, the person is patient when 
planning for the future, but impatient in making decisions in the present. 
Hyperbolic discounting could cause time-inconsistent preferences or 
preference reversals.186  For example, a person might say today that she 
prefers $100 in two years to $90 in one year, implying a (relatively patient) 
discount factor higher than 0.9.  But a year from now, if offered a choice 
between $90 immediately and $100 in a year, she might reverse course and 
take the $90, implying a (relatively impatient) discount factor of 0.9 or 
lower.    
Gruber and Koszegi assert that smokers are hyperbolic discounters.187  
If that is the case, then the rational addiction model requires revision.   
In the standard model, a person maximizes utility at time t according to 
a utility function that takes the following form:188 
 
          T-t 
∑ δiUt+i. 
             i=0 
  
The term Ut+i denotes the instantaneous utilities and δ is the discount factor. 
Intuitively, the idea is that people make choices (such as the decision to 
smoke) in order to maximize the sum of current and future utility.189  But 
because people care more about the present than the future, future utility is 
discounted according to δ.  Again, in the standard model, people discount 
exponentially.  Also, a particular individual’s δ could range from zero to 
one.  The closer it is to one, the greater the weight she places on her future 
utility.   
Gruber and Koszegi modify the standard model to incorporate 
hyperbolic discounting.  According to their model, the utility function takes 
the following form:190 
 
  T-t 
Ut + β  ∑  δiUt+i. 
   i=1 
 
δ is a long-term discount factor and is the analogue of the discount factor 
from the standard model.  β is a short-term discount factor.  Both δ and β 
                                                 
185 Id. at 360. 
186 Id. at 360–61. 
187 Gruber & Koszegi, Is Addiction Rational?, supra note 12, at 1280. 
188 Id.   
189 See GRUBER & KOSZEGI, MODERN VIEW, supra note 18, at 4. 
190 Gruber & Koszegi, Is Addiction Rational?, supra note 12, at 1280. 
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are assumed to be between zero and one. 
The key distinction between the standard model and the Gruber-Koszegi 
model is that the former contains only one discount factor, whereas the 
latter contains two.  In the Gruber-Koszegi model, δ is the discount factor 
between consecutive future periods.191  Between consecutive future periods, 
the person discounts exponentially, just as in the standard model.  The 
difference is that in the Gruber-Koszegi model, the person has an additional 
short-term discount factor (β) that applies only between the present and the 
immediate future.   
If β is less than one, as it would be for a hyperbolic discounter, then the 
discount factor between consecutive future periods (δ) will be larger than 
the discount factor between the current period and the next one (βδ).192  
This means that the person “is ‘impatient’ when faced with a choice 
between today and tomorrow, but she would like to ‘become patient’ in the 
future.”193 
If a person discounts more heavily in the short-run than in the long-run, 
her preferences will be inconsistent at different points in time, making her 
prone to preference reversals.  For example, at time t, a smoker might plan 
to quit at time t + 1.  She makes this decision because in discounting the 
health consequences of smoking, which will occur at time t + 2, she uses δ.  
This causes her to give health consequences significant weight.  But when it 
comes time to quit (i.e., time t + 1 arrives), she places less weight (βδ) on 
the future health consequences and decides to continue smoking.194 
Gruber and Koszegi interpret preference reversals of this type as 
evidence of a conflict between a person’s multiple selves.195  The planning 
self assigns great weight to future utility and plans to stop smoking.196  But 
the acting self is present-biased, gives less weight to the future, and fails to 
follow through on the plan.  Moreover, as β moves closer to zero, the acting 
self becomes more present-biased and prone to this type of preference 
reversal.  In other words, a low β implies a severe lack of self-control. 
Gruber and Koszegi argue that welfare ought to be determined 
regarding the wishes of the planning self, and the wishes of the acting self 
                                                 
191 Id. 
192 Id. 
193 Gruber & Koszegi, Tax Incidence, supra note 18, at 1965. 
194 GRUBER & KOSZEGI, MODERN VIEW, supra note 18, at 10. 
195 Id. at 10; Gruber, supra note 18, at 122. 
196 In discussing time-inconsistent preferences, Gruber refers to a conflict between the current self and the 
future self.  Gruber, supra note 18, at 122.  This terminology can be confusing because as time passes, the future 
self becomes the current self.  To reduce confusion, I refer to the conflict as involving the planning self and the 
acting self.  Differences in terminology aside, what matters is that a conflict occurs because when a smoker is 
planning for the future, she places great weight on the future health consequences and plans to quit.  But when she 
is deciding how to act today, she places less weight on the future and continues to smoke.  So the smoker’s 
opinion about quitting depends on whether she is making future plans (the planning self) or deciding how to act in 
the present (the acting self). 
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should be ignored.197  In other words, they claim that δ is the normatively 
appropriate discount factor.  By using β, the acting self “underweights” the 
future costs of smoking and smokes despite the fact that the planning self 
would like to quit.198  As a result, the acting self inflicts harm on the 
smoker, creating an “internality,” or intrapersonal externality.199  And just 
as a corrective tax is appropriate in the presence of interpersonal 
externalities, a self-control tax is appropriate in the presence of 
internalities.200 
Gruber and Koszegi point out that if a smoker is aware of her self-
control problem, her planning self will demand commitment devices that 
restrain the acting self, making quitting easier.201  They argue that a self-
control tax can serve as a commitment device.202   
Moreover, unlike traditional paternalism, in which paternalists use 
government to force their values onto others, Gruber and Koszegi claim that 
the paternalistic tax that they advocate simply allows the smoker to achieve 
the planning self’s goal of quitting.  In other words, a self-control tax carries 
out the wishes of the smoker’s planning self rather than the wishes of 
antismoking paternalists. 
Gruber and Koszegi use their model to derive the following formula for 
the optimal self-control tax on cigarettes (t*):203  
 
t* = (1 - β) δh. 
 
In the formula, h equals the dollar value of smoking-related health damage, 
which would include the dollar value of any years of life lost due to 
smoking.204   
Notice that if β is one, then the optimal self-control tax is zero.  This is 
because if β is one, then the person is an exponential discounter so her 
acting self and planning self use the same discount factor (δ).  In other 
                                                 
197 GRUBER & KOSZEGI, MODERN VIEW, supra note 18, at 10. 
198 Id. at 12–13. 
199 Gruber, supra note 18, at 124–25; Gruber & Koszegi, Is Addiction Rational?, supra note 12, at 1263. 
200 GRUBER & KOSZEGI, MODERN VIEW, supra note 18, at 12–13; Gruber & Koszegi, Is Addiction 
Rational?, supra note 12, at 1263. 
201 Gruber & Koszegi, Is Addiction Rational?, supra note 12, at 1278. 
202 GRUBER & KOSZEGI, MODERN VIEW, supra note 18, at 9. 
203 GRUBER & KOSZEGI, MODERN VIEW, supra note 18, at 12.  The formula that Gruber and Koszegi derive 
includes a variable to account for interpersonal externalities.  Id.  Since interpersonal externalities are not my 
focus, I omit that variable. 
Additionally, Gruber and Koszegi originally developed their model in an academic article.  See Gruber & 
Koszegi, Is Addiction Rational?, supra note 12, at 1279–93.  They subsequently produced a report suitable for a 
more general audience, which describes their model and its implications in less-formal terms, stripping away 
much of the mathematical complexity.  See GRUBER & KOSZEGI, MODERN VIEW, supra note 18, at 9–12.  For the 
sake of simplicity, my discussion focuses primarily on the formula that Gruber and Koszegi discuss in their less-
formal paper.  This formula is simpler than the formula they derive in their earlier article.  But my critique of the 
simplified formula applies with equal force to the more complex formula. 
204 GRUBER & KOSZEGI, MODERN VIEW, supra note 18, at 10, 16–17. 
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words, the acting self and planning self agree, and no self-control problem 
exists.   
But if β is less than one, the optimal self-control tax is positive as long 
as h is positive and δ is greater than zero.  If β is less than one, the acting 
self ignores health costs that the planning self would like for her to take into 
account.  Again, this occurs because the planning self discounts future 
health costs using only δ, while the acting self further discounts those costs 
using β.205 The self-control tax remedies this problem by effectively 
canceling out the influence of β, thereby forcing the acting self to make 
decisions consistent with the wishes of the planning self.206 
It is important to understand that Gruber and Koszegi do not argue that 
the self-control tax on cigarettes should be infinitely high.  Nor do they 
claim that all smoking is a mistake and that smoking should be eliminated.  
Instead, they argue that for hyperbolic discounters, the acting self does not 
give sufficient weight to the future costs of smoking.  And a tax can correct 
this mistake.  With the tax in place, even a hyperbolic discounter might 
rationally decide to smoke because the benefits of doing so outweigh the 
costs, including the tax.207   
From a policy perspective, this means that the government’s goal should 
be to adopt the optimal tax.  According to Gruber and Koszegi, the optimal 
tax is the tax that causes the acting self to give the same weight to the health 
consequences of smoking as the planning self.  This is the tax that will 
produce exactly the right amount of smoking.   
But, as the next Section will demonstrate, estimating the optimal tax 
with any precision is likely impossible.  Antismoking advocates may 
respond by simply assuming that cigarette taxes should be very high.  But 
within the Gruber-Koszegi framework, a self-control tax that is too high can 
be worse than one that is too low.208  It would deter people from smoking 
even though they would otherwise rationally choose to do so.  In other 
words, unless we are confident that the government will identify and adopt 
the optimal self-control tax, there is no guarantee that such a tax will 
increase social welfare.   
 
 
                                                 
205 Id. at 12–13. 
206 Id. at 12–13. 
207 Another way to think about this is to recognize that hyperbolic discounting only leads to “mistakes” to 
the extent it causes a person to make different decisions than the ones she would make if she gave appropriate 
weight to future consequences.  Cf. Lee Anne Fennell, Willpower and Legal Policy, 5 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 91, 
96 n.5 (2009) (citing sources that stand for the proposition that “[e]xternalities only produce inefficient results 
when they lead actors to make different decisions than the ones they would have reached after taking external 
costs and benefits into account, which will not always be the case”) [hereinafter Fennell, Willpower and Legal 
Policy]. 
208 Cf. Rizzo & Whitman, Slippery Slopes, supra note 18, at 735–35 (making a similar point with respect to 
sin taxes generally). 
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B.  Objections to the Self-Control Tax  
 
Gruber and Koszegi derive a seemingly simple formula to guide policy 
makers in determining the appropriate tax rate.  But this apparent simplicity 
disappears upon consideration of various factors that the formula either 
conceals or ignores.209  Specifically, heterogeneity and government failure 
complicate matters and cause the self-control tax to lose its attractiveness.  
Fortunately, as discussed in Section E, alternatives exist for helping 
smokers who have self-control problems. 
 
1. Heterogeneity  
 
Even if we assume that self-control problems explain why some people 
smoke, Gruber and Koszegi ignore the complications posed by 
heterogeneity.  If smokers are heterogeneous, the optimal self-control tax 
will vary from person to person and may be zero for some smokers.  
Unfortunately, the government can select only one tax rate.   
The most general evidence of heterogeneity is evidence that smokers 
differ with respect to their desire to quit.  If a smoker does not want to quit, 
that suggests that her smoking is not due to a lack of self-control.  In other 
words, no conflict exists between her planning self and acting self.   
As evidence that many smokers do not want to quit, consider the survey 
discussed in Part II, which found that approximately 60% of smokers 
reported that they do not plan to give up smoking in the near future.  
Consider also the fact that smokers generally do not support smoking 
regulations.  Gruber and Koszegi argue that smokers who would like to quit 
will demand commitment devices if they believe that they lack sufficient 
self-control to accomplish their objective.210  So we would expect these 
smokers to strongly support policies that make smoking expensive or that 
effectively place it off limits.211  Cigarette taxes, public smoking 
restrictions, and even a ban on cigarettes should appeal to the planning self 
(who would like to quit) because they constrain the acting self (who wants 
to smoke), effectively solving the self-control problem.212  Consistent with 
this hypothesis, some smokers who are planning to quit do support smoking 
                                                 
209 As discussed supra note 203, the formula discussed in the text is a simplified version of the formula 
derived in Gruber and Koszegi’s initial article.  But even their more complex formula ignores the many 
complications created by heterogeneity and government failure. 
210 Gruber & Koszegi, Is Addiction Rational?, supra note 12, at 1278. 
211 It is possible that a smoker would favor government-imposed restraints because they protect her from 
herself, but would still choose not to support smoking regulations because she believes that others should be free 
to smoke.  But it seems unlikely that additional respect among smokers for others’ autonomy explains the large 
gap in support for antismoking policies between smokers and nonsmokers. 
212 See Hersch, supra note 169, at 6 (“If smokers are seeking to quit smoking, smoking regulations can serve 
as a means of fostering their own self-control.). 
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regulations.213  Yet in general, smokers are much less likely than 
nonsmokers to favor cigarette taxes and other restrictions on smoking.214  
This is consistent with the view that many smokers do not want to quit and 
do not wish for the government to assist them in doing so.215    
The desire to quit is not the only source of heterogeneity among 
smokers.  In fact, smokers are likely heterogeneous with respect to each of 
the variables in the self-control tax formula.    
First, people are heterogeneous with respect to the dollar value of health 
damage that they sustain from smoking (h).  Gruber and Koszegi ignore this 
by focusing on the “typical” or average smoker.216  In calculating the 
optimal tax, they assign a value to h based on their estimate of the years of 
life lost due to smoking (six years) and their estimate of the dollar value of a 
life ($6.8 million).217  They conclude that h is $35.64 per pack.218  In other 
words, they assume that each pack of cigarettes smoked does the same 
amount of health damage in dollar terms.  In fact, the dollar amount of 
health damage from smoking varies significantly from person to person. 
There are at least three reasons for this.  The first reason is that the 
health damage from smoking results from smoking over a long period, not 
from smoking a single cigarette or pack of cigarettes.  As discussed in Part 
I, smokers who quit by age 35 (which describes a large number of modern-
day smokers) have virtually the same life expectancy as those who have 
never smoked.  So these smokers avoid most or all of the health 
                                                 
213 Id. at 20.  For example, a series of surveys conducted periodically from 1991–2002 finds that among 
daily smokers who report that they plan to quit in the next 6 months, over 21% support a ban on smoking in 
restaurants, compared to only 12% of those not planning to quit.  Id. at 15.  But it is important to note that even 
smokers who say that they are planning to quit are far less supportive of smoking regulations than never smokers.  
For example, support among never smokers for a ban on smoking in restaurants ranged from 57% in 1991–92 to 
nearly 70% in 2001–02.  Id. at 14.  Though it is not conclusive, the relative lack of support for smoking 
regulations even among those who claim that they are planning to quit is difficult to reconcile with the position 
that most smokers are in search of a commitment device that will help them overcome their self-control problems.   
214 For example, among those surveyed in 2001–02, nearly 70% of never smokers supported a ban on 
smoking in restaurants, while that figure was only 26% among smokers.  See, e.g., id. at 14.  Among Connecticut 
voters surveyed in 2002, 66% of smokers opposed a proposed cigarette tax increase, while 78% of nonsmokers 
supported it.  Gul & Pesendorfer, supra note 172, at 151.   
While it might seem inconsistent with the rational smoker model for any smoker to support public smoking 
bans and cigarette taxes, that is not necessarily the case.  For example, a smoker may believe that nonsmokers 
(particularly the smoker’s family and friends) should not be subjected to ETS involuntarily, or she may think that 
cigarette taxes are a fair and efficient way to fund the government.  
215 Cf. Gruber & Koszegi, Is Addiction Rational?, supra note 12, at 1294 (stating that “we have not proved 
time inconsistency in smoking decisions”).  A paternalist might respond by arguing that smokers do not support 
government regulation of smoking because they are naive about their self-control problems.  See id. at 1281 
(discussing naive hyperbolic discounters).  They want to quit but do not understand that they need the 
government’s help.  But this argument is difficult to prove or refute.  So it opens the paternalist up to the charge 
that she is attempting to impose her values on smokers rather than using government regulation to help smokers 
achieve their own goals.  In addition, paternalists often point to smokers’ use of commitment devices as strong 
evidence that self-control problems are pervasive among smokers.  Given this, it is inconsistent to simply dismiss 
the fact that many smokers oppose cigarette taxes or other smoking regulations that could serve as a strong 
commitment device. 
216 GRUBER & KOSZEGI, MODERN VIEW, supra note 18, at 10, 16–17. 
217 Id. at 16. 
218 Id. at 17. 
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consequences, which implies that h is at or near zero and no reason exists to 
impose a self-control tax.  The second reason is that even among those who 
suffer premature death, the number of years of life lost due to smoking 
varies significantly.219  The third reason is that people may differ in terms of 
the value that they place on good health and long life.  In particular, 
smokers may place a lower value on health and longevity than do 
nonsmokers, which could explain why they choose to smoke in the first 
place.220   
Second, people are likely heterogeneous with respect to the short-term 
discount factor (β).  The short-term discount factor determines the degree to 
which preferences are inconsistent over time.  In other words, it measures 
the smoker’s self-control problem.  And experience suggests that people 
differ with respect to self-control.   
More concretely, a number of studies suggest that hyperbolic 
discounting is not a universal phenomenon.  For example, Jesus Fernandez-
Villaverde and Arijit Mukherji present evidence that hyperbolic discounting 
is much less prevalent than is sometimes claimed.221  Additionally, in a 
study of smokers, Michel Grignon concludes “there is a considerable 
amount of individual heterogeneity in the probability to state present biased 
time preferences.”222  Moreover, Glenn Harrison and his colleagues find 
that smokers are not significantly more likely to exhibit time-inconsistent 
preferences than nonsmokers.223     
Given these findings, it is possible that some or many people have a β at 
or near one.  Recall that for anyone with a β of one, the optimal self-control 
tax is zero because the person discounts exponentially.  Moreover, even 
among hyperbolic discounters, β likely varies a great deal from person to 
person.   
Finally, people are likely heterogeneous with respect to the long-term 
discount factor (δ).  The long-term discount factor reflects the degree of 
patience exercised by the planning self.  It seems likely that some people 
are more patient than others.  In fact, several studies find wide variation in 
discounting among individuals.224  In particular, as discussed in Part I, the 
typical smoker may discount the future more heavily than the typical 
                                                 
219 For example, as discussed in Part 1, Jerome Adda and Valerie Lechene find that on average, people who 
have long life expectancies (because they do not have illnesses unrelated to smoking) lose 1.5 more years of life 
by smoking than people who have short life expectancies (because they have illnesses not caused by smoking).   
Adda & Lechene, supra note 89, at 32. 
220 See supra Part I.A.3.a. 
221 Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde & Arijit Mukherji, Can We Really Observe Hyperbolic Discounting? 1 
(March 18, 2006) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
222 Grignon, supra note 164, at 745. 
223 Glenn Harrison et al., Individual Discount Rates and Smoking, 29 J. HEALTH ECON. 708, 37–38 (2010). 
224 Glenn Harrison et al., Estimating Individual Discount Rates in Denmark: A Field Experiment, 92 AM. 
ECON. REV. 1606, 1614–17 (2002) (finding variation based on demographic characteristics); see also studies cited 
supra note 73 (finding that smokers have higher discount rates than nonsmokers). 
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nonsmoker.225  That is important because if a person has a low δ, then even 
that person’s planning self greatly discounts the health costs of smoking.  
This could cause the planning self to want to smoke so that the planning self 
and acting self are in agreement.   
Again, if people are heterogeneous, then the optimal self-control tax 
will vary from person to person and may be zero for some people.  The 
problem is that the tax is a one-size-fits-all solution that the government 
cannot tailor to each individual.226   
As a result, if the goal is to maximize social welfare, heterogeneity 
forces the government to select a tax rate that minimizes the cost of two 
types of errors—under-consumption and over-consumption.227  If the rate 
that the government selects is too high for a particular smoker, she might 
quit when she would otherwise rationally choose to smoke.  But if it is too 
low, she may continue to smoke even though she would quit if she were 
perfectly rational.   
In this latter case, the smoker may face a “double-cost” problem.228  She 
pays the self-control tax, which forces her acting self to internalize 
smoking’s long-term costs.  But because the tax is too low, she continues to 
smoke and still suffers the health damage that the tax is designed to help her 
avoid.  In effect, she pays the same costs twice. 
Because of heterogeneity, the government needs extensive information 
to ensure that the tax rate that it selects will enhance welfare relative to the 
no-tax baseline.  In particular, the government needs to know the 
distribution (the population heterogeneity) of the degree of self-control 
problems and of smoking-related health costs.229  Unfortunately, the 
government does not have (and is unlikely to obtain) this information. 
In addition, the problems created by heterogeneity will be exacerbated if 
smokers who have self-control problems are significantly less responsive to 
cigarette taxes than those who do not.230  In that case, the taxes will simply 
burden rational smokers without benefitting smokers who lack self-control.  
On this point, Jason Fletcher and his colleagues find evidence that younger 
smokers who have low self-control and high discount rates are not very 
responsive to cigarette taxes.231  Fletcher concludes that “[t]hose who have 
                                                 
225 See studies cited supra note 73. 
226 See Rizzo & Whitman, Knowledge Problem, supra note 18, at 962–63 (discussing this problem in the 
context of a tax on potato chips). 
227 See id. at 962 (discussing this problem in the context of a tax on potato chips); O’Donoghue & Rabin, 
Optimal Sin Taxes, supra note 18, at 1835 (same). 
228 See Jeff Strnad, Conceptualizing the “Fat Tax”: The Role of Food Taxes in Developed Economies, 78 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1221, 1254–55 (2005) (discussing a similar problem in the context of food taxes); Fennell, 
Willpower Taxes, supra note 23, at 1412 (noting that this is a problem with self-control taxes generally). 
229 Cf. Rizzo & Whitman, Knowledge Problem, supra note 18, at 963 (discussing the information required to 
determine the optimal potato chip tax if the population is heterogeneous). 
230 See O’Donoghue & Rabin, Optimal Sin Taxes, supra note 18, at 1835. 
231 Jason Fletcher et al., Tobacco Use, Taxation and Self-Control in Adolescence 12 (June 25, 2009) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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the least willpower may need the most help in quitting but are unresponsive 
to taxes.”232   
 
2. Imperfect Information  
 
Government failure also creates problems for the self-control tax.  The 
first source of failure is the government’s lack of complete information.233  
The government lacks the information necessary to estimate the variables in 
the self-control tax formula with adequate precision.  It also lacks 
information about factors that are relevant to determining the optimal self-
control tax but that are not accounted for in the formula.  Obtaining the 
necessary information would be challenging even if smokers were 
homogeneous, but the fact that smokers are heterogeneous worsens the 
problem. 
The first variable the government needs information on is the dollar 
value of the health damage resulting from smoking (h).  This variable 
depends in large part on the value assigned to the years of life that smokers 
lose due to smoking.  Valuing life is not easy, so estimating h would be 
difficult even if smokers were homogeneous.  But, as already discussed, h 
varies from smoker to smoker and is at or near zero for those smokers who 
avoid premature death by quitting early in life.  Again, Gruber and Koszegi 
deal with this fact by focusing on the typical smoker in their calculations.234  
Unfortunately, this approach produces a tax rate that is far too high for the 
many smokers who experience significantly less than average health 
damage. 
The next two variables about which the government needs information 
are the short-term discount rate (β) and the long-term discount rate (δ).  
Recall that these variables are designed to measure the smoker’s self-
control problem (β) and long-run level of patience (δ).  We might expect 
that placing a value on traits like self-control and patience would be 
difficult.  So it comes as no surprise that economists have had trouble 
estimating discount rates.  In a review of the literature, Shane Frederick and 
his colleagues find “tremendous variability in the estimates” from one study 
to the next.235  The estimated annual discount rates “range from -6 percent 
to infinity.”236  Moreover, “there is no evidence of methodological progress; 
the range of estimates is not shrinking over time.”237 
                                                 
232 Id. at 1. 
233 For a discussion of the information required to allow the government to correct various failures of 
rationality, see generally Rizzo & Whitman, Knowledge Problem, supra note 18. 
234 See GRUBER & KOSZEGI, MODERN VIEW, supra note 18, at 10, 16–17 (stating that their calculations “use 
the fact that smokers die on average six years earlier”). 
235 Frederick et al., supra note 184, at 377. 
236 Id. 
237 Id.  To compound the problem, contrary to the Gruber-Koszegi model, a hyperbolic discounter does not 
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Even if the government could accurately estimate h, β, and δ, its work 
would not be finished.  The formula presented above is a simplified version 
that ignores addiction.  Gruber and Koszegi derive another, more complex 
formula that incorporates addiction.238  This second formula contains even 
more variables, and while they note that the optimal tax is “quite sensitive” 
to these additional variables, Gruber and Koszegi concede that their values 
are not clear.239  As a result, they present various estimates of the optimal 
tax based on a range of values.240 
The government’s inability to precisely estimate the variables in the 
self-control tax formula is problematic because the optimal tax rate is very 
sensitive to these variables.  To illustrate, consider the effects of varying 
only β.  Gruber and Koszegi admit that a precise measure of β is unavailable 
so they provide a range of estimates of the optimal self-control tax 
depending on various values of β.241  If β equals one, then the optimal tax is 
zero (because people are exponential discounters).242  But if β equals 0.6, 
then, according to Gruber and Koszegi, the optimal tax is $14.26 per 
pack.243   
These calculations show that even if the government knew the 
appropriate values for the variables other than β (which it does not), it 
would still be difficult to determine the optimal self-control tax with any 
precision.  Moreover, simply adopting the highest estimate (e.g., on the 
grounds that a higher tax will reduce smoking more) is inappropriate.  That 
estimate may be far too high, in which case the tax would reduce smoking 
well below the optimal amount.  In other words, taxes of over $14 per pack 
might cause some people to quit smoking even though, for them at least, 
smoking is a rational choice. 
To make matters worse, even the expanded formula that Gruber and 
Koszegi develop (the formula that accounts for addiction) ignores factors 
relevant to the optimal tax calculation.  In particular, Gruber and Koszegi 
                                                                                                                            
have only two discount factors.  The model is misleading because by assuming only two discount factors it 
reflects “quasi-hyperbolic” discounting.  Economists sometimes assume quasi-hyperbolic discounting, not 
because empirical evidence suggests that people are quasi-hyperbolic discounters, but because it is easier to model 
than true hyperbolic discounting.  A true hyperbolic discounter has many discount factors because discount rates 
(which determine the discount factor) steadily decrease with distance from the present.  For example, Richard 
Thaler estimated three annual discount rates varying with time horizon—345% over a one-month horizon, 120% 
over a one-year horizon, and 19% over a ten-year horizon.  Richard Thaler, Some Empirical Evidence on Dynamic 
Inconsistency, 8 ECON. LETTERS 201, 204 (1981).  If people are hyperbolic discounters, then the government has 
to estimate not just two discount factors, but many.  For further discussion of this issue, see Rizzo & Whitman, 
Knowledge Problem, supra note 18, at 925–27. 
238 Gruber and Koszegi derive this formula in their initial article.  Gruber & Koszegi, Is Addiction Rational?, 
supra note 12, at 1279–92. 
239 Gruber & Koszegi, Is Addiction Rational?, supra note 12, at 1291. 
240 Id. 
241 GRUBER & KOSZEGI, MODERN VIEW, supra note 18, at 10, 17. 
242 Id.  Gruber and Koszegi’s optimal tax estimates include a tax of $.40 per pack to reflect smoking’s 
interpersonal externalities.  Id.  Since my focus is on the self-control component of the tax, the estimates presented 
in the text ignore this amount. 
243 Id. 
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assume that if a smoker suffers from a self-control problem, a tax that 
corrects that problem will make her better off.  This assumption is not 
necessarily true.  Gregory Besharov demonstrates that departures from 
rationality do not always lead to suboptimal choices.244  Instead, one failure 
of rationality may offset another.245  For example, if a smoker suffers from 
cognitive biases as well as a self-control problem, the two may counteract 
one another.  This means that correcting the self-control problem without 
correcting the cognitive biases has ambiguous effects on welfare.  It could 
actually decrease welfare by moving the smoker’s cigarette consumption 
further away from the optimum.   
To illustrate, consider the finding that people overestimate highly 
publicized risks.246  Consistent with this finding, many people overestimate 
the risks of smoking.  This has the effect of reducing smoking from the 
level that would otherwise prevail.247  The bias that leads people to 
overestimate smoking’s risks may partially, fully, or more than fully offset 
any excessive smoking resulting from self-control problems.  So correcting 
self-control problems without considering the tendency to overestimate 
smoking’s risks could reduce welfare relative to the no-tax baseline.248  
Gruber and Koszegi do not account for this possibility. 
Gruber and Koszegi may also overstate the need for government 
intervention.  People often can overcome self-control problems on their 
own.249  One way they do this is by exercising willpower or taking steps to 
avoid temptation.250  Another tool, already discussed, is a private 
commitment device.251  Willpower and other self-management techniques 
may reduce the government’s potential role. 
 
3. Lack of Control over Smokers’ Responses to Taxation  
 
The second source of government failure is lack of control over 
smoker’s responses to taxation.  A growing body of research shows that 
many smokers respond to cigarette taxes in dangerous ways, and the 
                                                 
244 Gregory Besharov, Second-Best Considerations in Correcting Cognitive Biases, 71 S. ECON. J. 12, 15–19 
(2004). 
245 Id. at 15–19. 
246 FISCHHOFF ET AL., supra note 130, at 29. 
247 VISCUSI, RISKY DECISION, supra note 12, at 99–100 (concluding that the smoking rate would be 
significantly higher if people did not overestimate the risk of lung cancer). 
248 Rizzo and Whitman make this point.  Rizzo & Whitman, Knowledge Problem, supra note 18, at 953; cf. 
VISCUSI, SMOKE-FILLED ROOMS, supra note 106, at 61 (noting that if smokers overestimate smoking’s risks, that 
would tend to offset any excessive smoking resulting from ignoring future health costs). 
249 For a discussion of “self-regulation” and “self-debiasing,” see Rizzo & Whitman, Knowledge Problem, 
supra note 18, at 943–46. 
250 For a discussion of willpower, see generally Fennell, Willpower Taxes, supra note 23; Fennell, Willpower 
and Legal Policy, supra note 207; Mark Muraven & Roy Baumeister, Self-Regulation and Depletion of Limited 
Resources, Does Self-Control Resemble a Muscle?, 126 PSYCH. BULLETIN 247 (2000). 
251 As discussed in Section E of this Part, a recent experiment testing a commitment contract designed to 
facilitate smoking cessation demonstrates that private commitment devices can be effective. 
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resulting harm at least partially offsets any health benefits from reduced 
smoking.  Gruber and Koszegi ignore this problem.     
The first undesirable response involves switching to more harmful 
cigarettes and smoking cigarettes in more dangerous ways.  If smokers want 
a particular level of tar and nicotine, we would expect them to respond to 
cigarette taxes by finding ways to extract more tar and nicotine per cigarette 
smoked.252  In fact, that appears to be the case.253   
Matthew Farrelly and his colleagues find that many smokers respond to 
cigarette taxes not only by cutting back on daily consumption, but also by 
switching to cigarettes that are higher in tar and nicotine.254  As a result, 
Farrelly concludes that “cigarette excise taxes appear to have no effect on 
total tar consumption,” and “the health benefits of [cigarette price] increases 
are negated by a corresponding increase in tar—the cancer-causing agent in 
cigarettes.”255 
Similarly, Jerome Adda and Francesca Cornaglia find that smokers 
respond to cigarette taxes by smoking more intensely.256  As cigarettes 
become more expensive, smokers inhale more deeply, increase the number 
of puffs, use their fingers to cover the side air vents, and smoke down to the 
filter.257  From a public health perspective, this type of compensating 
behavior is regrettable because it increases the health risks involved.258 
The second undesirable response is weight gain.  Quitting smoking 
might increase weight for a number of reasons.  These include the fact that 
smoking speeds up the metabolism and acts as an appetite suppressant and 
that quitting frees up income to be used for food.259  Empirical research on 
the relationship between quitting smoking and weight gain has produced 
mixed results.260  But a number of recent studies have concluded that 
                                                 
252 Matthew Farrelly et al., The Effects of Higher Cigarette Prices on Tar and Nicotine Consumption in a 
Cohort of Adult Smokers, 13 HEALTH ECON. 49, 56 (2004). 
253 The way in which people respond to cigarette taxes is similar to how they respond to safety measures 
(e.g., mandatory seat belt laws).  They increase risk taking (e.g., by driving faster) in a way that tends to 
undermine the policy goal.  See VISCUSI, SMOKE-FILLED ROOMS, supra note 106, at 66. 
254 Farrelly et al., supra note 252, at 54. 
255 Id. at 55–56. 
256 Jerome Adda and Francesca Cornaglia, Taxes, Cigarette Consumption, and Smoking Intensity, AM. 
ECON. REV. 1013, 1013 (2006).   
257 For a discussion of the literature on the various ways smokers regulate the amount of nicotine they extract 
from cigarettes, see id. at 1013–14, 1025. 
258 Id. at 1014. 
259 Charles Baum, The Effects of Cigarette Taxes on Obesity, 18 HEALTH ECON. 3, 4 (2009); Anindya Sen et 
al., Obesity, Smoking, and Cigarette Taxes: Evidence from Canada, 97 HEALTH POL’Y 180, 181 (2010).
 
260 A number of studies find that cigarette taxes contribute to obesity.  Baum, supra note 259, at 5; Sen et al., 
supra note 259, at 186; Philip DeCicca, Are Obese Smokers an Unintended Consequence of Higher Cigarette 
Taxes? 19 (June 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); Shin-Yi Chou et al., An Economic Analysis 
of Adult Obesity, 23 J. HEALTH ECON. 565, 585 (2004).  But Jonathan Gruber and Michael Frakes find that “there 
is no evidence of a large weight effect from smoking cessation.”  Jonathan Gruber & Michael Frakes, Does 
Falling Smoking Lead to Rising Obesity, 25 J. HEALTH ECON. 183, 196 (2006).  Similarly, James Nonnemaker 
and his colleagues find that cigarette taxes cause only “modest” weight gain among former smokers.  James 
Nonnemaker et al., Have Efforts to Reduce Smoking Really Contributed to the Obesity Epidemic?, 47 ECON. 
INQUIRY 366, 376 (2009). 
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cigarette taxes increase obesity, perhaps significantly.261  If cigarette taxes 
contribute to obesity, that mutes the health benefits because obesity is itself 
linked to illness and premature death.262 
 
4. Flaws in the Political Process  
 
The third source of government failure is flaws in the political process.  
It seems unlikely that most legislators care whether a proposed cigarette tax 
increase is optimal within Gruber and Koszegi’s analytical framework.  
Instead, legislators view cigarette taxes as a way to raise revenue at low 
political cost.263  The tax burden falls on a shrinking minority and on a 
product viewed by nonsmokers with disdain.264  As a result, legislators can 
increase cigarette taxes with relatively little resistance from voters.265  In 
fact, organized antismoking advocates actively lobby for higher cigarette 
taxes.266  So at a time when governments are desperate for revenue, pressure 
exists to raise cigarette taxes, even if doing so decreases social welfare.   
Widespread acceptance of the need for a self-control tax would likely 
exacerbate this problem, leading us down a slippery slope to ever-increasing 
taxes.  The literature on slippery slope arguments suggests that the slide 
down the slope is more likely to occur when “the absence of a sharp line 
between different cases eases the process of moving from one to 
another.”267  This usually results from a key term that is vague.268  In our 
context, the notion of an optimal self-control tax is vague because imperfect 
information makes it impossible to identify the optimal tax rate with any 
precision.  This means that antismoking advocates (many of whom favor 
tax increases not because they are welfare-enhancing but simply because 
they will reduce smoking) are free to use the Gruber-Koszegi model as 
intellectual cover to argue for one tax increase after another.269   
                                                 
261 Sen et al., supra note 259, at 186 (using data from Canada and finding “a statistically significant 
correlation between higher cigarette taxes and a more obese population”); Baum, supra note 259, at 5 (concluding 
that cigarette taxes “significantly increase . . . obesity and overweight”); DeCicca, supra note 260, at 19, 22 
(finding that cigarette taxes increase obesity among women and older men); Chou et al., supra note 260, at 585 
(finding that increases in cigarette taxes have “contributed to the upward trend in obesity”). 
262 Baum, supra note 259, at 4. 
263 VISCUSI, SMOKE-FILLED ROOMS, supra note 106, at 61. 
264 As evidence of nonsmokers dislike for smoking, consider that nonsmokers overwhelmingly support 
restricting smoking in various public places, including restaurants, malls, and indoor sporting events.  Hersch, 
supra note 169, at 14. 
265 For example, in a survey of Connecticut voters, 78% of nonsmokers supported a proposed cigarette tax 
increase, which Connecticut ultimately adopted.  Gul & Pesendorfer, supra note 172, at 151. 
266 E.g., CAMPAIGN FOR TOBACCO-FREE KIDS, RELIABLE SOURCE, supra note 8, at 1–2. 
267 Rizzo & Whitman, Slippery Slopes, supra note 18, at 691. 
268 Id. 
269 The slippery slope phenomenon seems to be at work in Gruber and Koszegi’s own writings on the self-
control tax.  In their initial article, Gruber and Koszegi argue that their model supports a self-control tax of at least 
$1 per pack, which they suggest is a conservative estimate.  Gruber & Koszegi, Is Addiction Rational?, supra note 
12, at 1292.  But in a subsequent paper, they suggest that the tax should be much higher, perhaps as high as $14 
per pack.  GRUBER & KOSZEGI, MODERN VIEW, supra note 18, at 17. 
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One way to resist this type of slippery slope is to follow bright-line 
rules.270  In this case, an appropriate rule might be that cigarette taxes 
should be based only on smoking’s external costs (i.e., harm to others), not 
on paternalism. 
To summarize, the government should not adopt a self-control tax on 
cigarettes.  Smokers are likely heterogeneous with respect to all of the 
variables in the self-control tax formula.  Heterogeneity means that there is 
not a single optimal tax rate.  Ideally, the government would tailor the tax to 
the needs of each individual smoker, but that is not possible.  Also, the 
government does not possess (and is not able to obtain) the information 
required to estimate the optimal tax rate.  Any estimates are unlikely to be 
scientific and will instead involve little more than guesswork. 
Moreover, many smokers react to cigarette taxes in dangerous ways.  
The government cannot control or fully predict these responses, which mute 
the desired health benefits.   
Finally, if the need for a self-control tax is widely accepted, the 
government’s inability to accurately estimate the optimal tax rate, when 
combined with flaws in the political process, is likely to create a slippery 
slope.  Cigarette taxes will continue to increase even if the tax increases are 
not welfare-enhancing.   
 
C.  Optimism Bias  
  
While it is important, the Gruber-Koszegi model is only one of several 
theories of smoking that incorporate imperfect rationality.271  To show that 
heterogeneity and government failure pose problems for paternalistic taxes 
no matter what theory is used to justify them, this Section discusses the 
claim that smokers suffer from optimism bias.   
As discussed in Part I, survey evidence indicates that many smokers 
overestimate the risks of smoking.  But some scholars argue that this 
evidence is misleading.  They claim that although smokers may 
overestimate the risk that smoking imposes on others, they underestimate 
the risk to themselves.272  In other words, people smoke even though they 
are aware of the risks because they do not believe that these risks apply to 
them personally.  If “optimism bias” causes smokers to believe that they are 
immune from the risks that others face, then providing smokers with 
additional information or warnings will not work.  In that case, cigarette 
taxes might correct the problem by reducing smoking to the level that 
would prevail if smokers were rational about risks. 
                                                 
270 Rizzo & Whitman, Slippery Slopes, supra note 18, at 738. 
271 For a discussion of several of these theories, see Hanson & Logue, supra note 17, at 1181–1223. 
272 Id. at 1186–88.    
41
Lucas: SAVING SMOKERS FROM THEMSELVES: THE PATERNALISTIC USE OF CIGARETT
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2012
42 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
But the evidence of optimism bias among smokers is not very 
convincing.  A number of studies do find that in general people often claim 
that their own abilities are above average and that the risk that they face for 
various hazards is less than the risk faced by the average person.273  For 
example, most people claim that they are better drivers than the average 
person.274  And far more people claim that they are at below-average risk 
for contracting pneumonia than at above-average risk.275  But evidence of 
optimism bias specific to smoking consists primarily of the study by 
Michael Schoenbaum discussed in Part I.  Recall that Schoenbaum surveyed 
older adults and found that heavy smokers overestimate their chances of 
surviving to age 75.276   
Nevertheless, there are reasons to be cautious in accepting this study as 
proof of widespread optimism bias among smokers.  First, as already noted, 
even Schoenbaum finds that older smokers who are light smokers (68% of 
the smokers in his sample) either accurately estimate or overestimate their 
own risk of premature death.277  Second, a more recent study by Ahmed 
Khwaja and his colleagues finds that older smokers are “quite accurate on 
average” in assessing their chances of surviving to age 75.278  Third, a 1993 
Gallup poll finds that 65% of smokers believe that smoking has already 
harmed their health and 78% believe that they are either likely or very likely 
to suffer serious health problems if they do not quit smoking.279  Fourth, 
many smokers who quit cite health concerns as the reason, which is 
evidence that smokers know that they are not invulnerable.280  Finally, the 
optimism bias hypothesis is difficult to reconcile with the fact that better 
information about health risks has led to a dramatic decline in both the 
smoking rate and the median cessation age.281 
At most, the existing evidence supports the conclusion that a small 
percentage of smokers might be excessively optimistic in predicting their 
survival chances.  Moreover, it is not even clear whether this excessive 
optimism results from incorrigible optimism bias or whether it could be 
corrected by providing these smokers with better information about 
smoking’s effects on mortality. 
So what does this all mean for cigarette tax policy?  It means that the 
evidence related to optimism bias provides no more support for a 
paternalistic tax than does the evidence related to self-control problems.  All 
                                                 
273 Neil D. Weinstein, Optimistic Biases about Personal Risks, 246 SCI. 1232, 1232 (1989). 
274 Viscusi, Paternalism, supra note 150, at 60. 
275 Weinstein, supra note 273, at 1232.  
276 Schoenbaum, supra note 133, at 757. 
277 Goldfarb et al., supra note 38, at 237 (making this point).  
278 Khwaja et al., Mature Smokers, supra note 139, at 396. 
279 Viscusi, Paternalism, supra note 150, at 60. 
280 Larabie, supra note 49, at 426; Khwaja	  et	  al.,	  Time	  Preference,	  supra	  note	  37,	  at	  930. 
281 See supra Part I.A.2. 
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that can be said is that smokers appear to be heterogeneous, with most 
accurately perceiving the risks to themselves (or overestimating those 
risks), but with some underestimating the risks (perhaps due to optimism 
bias).  Again, heterogeneity is problematic because a paternalistic tax is a 
one-size-fits-all solution.  It may help those who suffer from optimism bias, 
but it will harm those who do not.   
In addition, the government lacks the information necessary to 
determine the optimal tax rate.  To correct optimism bias, the government 
would need to set the tax to reflect the health costs that smokers ignore 
because of their excessive optimism.  These health costs include fewer 
years of life.  So the government needs to know the extent to which smokers 
who suffer from optimism bias underestimate their personal risk of 
premature death.  Do they completely ignore the risk?  Do they believe that 
their personal risk is 20% of the risk to others?  Do they differ with respect 
to the degree of optimism bias?  This type of information is not easy to 
obtain.  In the end, policy makers simply have to guess about the optimal 
amount of the tax.  And there is no way to know whether the tax rate that 
they select will increase social welfare, especially since political 
considerations are likely to drive the rate-selection process.    
 
D.  Regressivity  
  
Many tax scholars believe that the government should base taxation on 
the ability to pay—the greater the income, the more you pay.282  Those who 
accept this principle view regressivity as unfair.  A regressive tax is one that 
imposes a greater burden on the poor than the rich.  More specifically, the 
traditional definition of a regressive tax is one for which the average tax rate 
decreases as income increases.283  This definition focuses on tax 
expenditures.  It assumes that the burden of a tax is measured by taxes paid 
as a percentage of income.     
By this measure, cigarette taxes are extremely regressive.284  There are 
two reasons for this.285  First, most taxes imposed on the sale of goods are 
regressive simply because the poor spend a larger percentage of their 
incomes than the rich, who are able to save more.286  Second, cigarette taxes 
are particularly regressive because the smoking rate is much higher among 
                                                 
282 E.g., Slemrod & Bakija, supra note 100, at 64–66. 
283 Id. at 60. 
284 E.g., Viscusi, Principles, supra note 98, at 82; Gruber & Koszegi, Tax Incidence, supra note 18, at 1962 
(“Cigarette expenditures as a share of income are 3.2% in the bottom quartile of the income distribution, but are 
only 0.4% of income in the top quartile.”). 
285 Dahlia K. Remler, Poor Smokers, Poor Quitters, and Cigarette Tax Regressivity, 94 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 
225, 225 (2004).   
286 Id.  This might not be the case for taxes on luxury items, which are disproportionately consumed by the 
rich.  Id. 
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the poor.287  In 2009, the smoking rate for adults living below the federal 
poverty level was 30.6%, while it was only 12.1% for adults with family 
income of $100,000 or more.288  As a result, cigarette taxes impose a large 
and disproportionate burden on the poor.289 
Until recently, cigarette tax regressivity was not that important because 
cigarette taxes were so low.  But today, the average combined federal and 
state tax is $2.18 per pack, which amounts to nearly $800 per year for a 
pack-a-day smoker.290  Moreover, the tax burden is much greater in many 
states and cities.  And while cigarette taxes do cause some low-income 
smokers to quit, others continue to smoke while reducing spending on 
necessities, e.g., housing.291  So cigarette taxes burden not only low-income 
smokers but also their families as well. 
But as part of their effort to encourage cigarette tax increases, Jonathan 
Gruber and Botond Koszegi argue that cigarette taxes are not as regressive 
as the traditional expenditure-based measure of regressivity implies.292  
They argue instead for a more comprehensive welfare-based measure.   
Gruber and Koszegi point out that the true burden resulting from 
cigarette taxes depends on how the taxes affect utility.293  This happens in 
two ways.  The first effect is the reduction in utility for those who continue 
to smoke, but must now pay a higher price.294  The traditional expenditure-
based measure of regressivity captures this effect.  The second effect, which 
the traditional measure does not capture, occurs if some smokers quit or cut 
back in response to taxes.295   
This second effect could involve an increase or decrease in utility.  If 
smoking is a rational choice, utility decreases because some smokers no 
longer consume a product the benefits of which outweigh the pretax costs 
                                                 
287 Id. 
288 CDC, supra note 26, at 88. 
289 The traditional measure of regressivity focuses on annual income.  But regressivity persists (though it is 
somewhat reduced) if we use measures, e.g., consumption, that some argue better reflect lifetime income.  
Remler, supra note 285, at 226; Gruber & Koszegi, Tax Incidence, supra note 18, at 1962. 
290 See ORZECHOWSKI & WALKER, supra note 3, at iv. 
291 Busch et al., supra note 29, at 266–71.  Busch finds that low-income households that include a smoker 
spend significantly less on housing than low-income households that do not.  Id. at 266.  Among the poor, 
smoking households also devote a smaller share of their budgets to food and apparel.  Id. at 267.  Busch also finds 
evidence that as cigarette prices increase, low-income households spend less on housing.  Id. at 269.  Taken 
together, these findings suggest that cigarette expenditures crowd out spending on other goods, including 
necessities.   
A problem with Busch’s study is that her data reveal a price elasticity for tobacco of -0.986, which differs 
substantially from the consensus estimate of -0.3 to -0.5.  Id. at 270.  In other words, other studies suggest that 
smokers are much less responsive to price than Busch’s elasticity estimate implies.  This means that Busch’s study 
may understate the magnitude by which smokers’ expenditures on cigarettes increase when the government 
increases cigarette taxes.  If that is the case, then the crowd-out effect of cigarette taxes will be even larger than 
Busch estimates (perhaps substantially larger).  
292 Gruber & Koszegi, Tax Incidence, supra note 18, at 1980. 
293 Id. at 1960. 
294 GRUBER & KOSZEGI, MODERN VIEW, supra note 18, at 14; Remler, supra note 285, at 227. 
295 GRUBER & KOSZEGI, MODERN VIEW, supra note 18, at 14; Remler, supra note 285, at 227. 
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(according to smokers’ own rational calculations).296  This reduction in 
utility increases the tax burden.  But if smoking is suboptimal, smokers who 
respond to a tax by quitting or cutting back are better off, which decreases 
the tax burden in utility terms.297  The tax simply encourages these smokers 
to do something that they should have done already. 
As discussed in Section A, Gruber and Koszegi believe that smoking is 
suboptimal; many smokers would quit if they had sufficient self-control.  
As a result, they argue that by forcing smokers to quit or cut back, cigarette 
taxes produce a significant benefit that the traditional definition of 
regressivity ignores.  Moreover, this benefit increases the more responsive 
smokers are to cigarette tax increases.298  In other words, taxes are more 
effective at reducing over-consumption for smokers who are especially 
sensitive to price.299  Gruber and Koszegi claim that low-income smokers 
are much more price sensitive than high-income smokers.300  So low-
income smokers receive a greater benefit in the form of quitting or cutting 
back, which may significantly reduce regressivity (or even cause cigarette 
taxes to be progressive).301 
This argument is subject to at least two criticisms.  First, as discussed in 
Section B, Gruber and Koszegi may overstate the problem posed by 
suboptimal smoking.  In their model, the benefit of using taxes to force 
smokers to quit depends on the degree of smokers’ self-control problems 
and on smoking’s health costs.302  The more severe a smoker’s self-control 
problem, the more her acting self underweights the long-term health 
consequences and the more likely she will be to smoke even though her 
planning self would like for her to quit.  Additionally, the greater the long-
term health costs, the more damaging the acting self’s mistake.303  But we 
have seen that the extent to which self-control problems cause smoking is 
far from clear.  Also, the health costs of smoking are much lower for those 
who quit early in life, which is much more common now than in the past.     
If suboptimal smoking is not as serious a problem as Gruber and 
Koszegi claim, then using cigarette taxes to compel smokers to quit will not 
produce large utility gains among the poor.  So shifting from an 
expenditure-based measure to a welfare-based measure will not 
                                                 
296 GRUBER & KOSZEGI, MODERN VIEW, supra note 18, at 14; Remler, supra note 285, at 227. 
297 GRUBER & KOSZEGI, MODERN VIEW, supra note 18, at 14; Remler, supra note 285, at 227–28; & 
Koszegi, Tax Incidence, supra note 18, at 1961 (noting that “a price-induced decrease in consumption may be 
good for the agent, because it softens the overconsumption due to the desire for immediate gratification”).	  
298 GRUBER & KOSZEGI, MODERN VIEW, supra note 18, at 15; Gruber & Koszegi, Tax Incidence, supra note 
18, at 1970, 1977. 
299 Gruber & Koszegi, Tax Incidence, supra note 18, at 1970. 
300 Gruber & Koszegi, Tax Incidence, supra note 18, at 1975–76. 
301 Id. at 1977–78. 
302 GRUBER & KOSZEGI, MODERN VIEW, supra note 18, at 15; Gruber & Koszegi, Tax Incidence, supra note 
18, at 1974–78. 
303 GRUBER & KOSZEGI, MODERN VIEW, supra note 18, at 15. 
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significantly reduce regressivity.   
Second, Gruber and Koszegi may also overstate how sensitive low-
income smokers are to cigarette tax increases.  Even if we accept that 
smoking reduces utility, cigarette taxes benefit smokers only if they respond 
by quitting or cutting back significantly.  Unless they cut back significantly, 
those who continue to smoke bear a greater burden than before because they 
must pay a higher price.  Gruber and Koszegi claim that low-income 
smokers are very sensitive to cigarette taxes.  More specifically, they find a 
price elasticity of nearly -1.1 for smokers in the bottom income quartile.304  
This suggests that a 10% increase in cigarette price leads to an 11% 
reduction in smoking, which is a relatively large response. 
But this finding is highly controversial.  As an initial matter, it is 
difficult to reconcile with the fact that the smoking rate among the poor 
remains high.  In fact, despite significant cigarette tax increases during the 
period, the smoking rate among adults below the federal poverty level fell 
only slightly between 1997 (when it was 33.3%) and 2009 (when it was 
30.6%).   
In addition, a number of price elasticity studies suggest that while low-
income smokers do respond to cigarette taxes, they are not nearly as price 
sensitive as Gruber and Koszegi claim.305  For example, Gregory Colman 
and Dahlia Remler find a price elasticity of -0.37 among low-income 
groups.306  Matthew Farrelly and his colleagues find an elasticity of -0.43 
for the bottom half of the income distribution.307  Similarly, William Evans 
and his colleagues find an elasticity of -0.32 for the bottom half of the 
income distribution.308  Finally, Nicolay Gospodinov and Ian Irvine find  
elasticity among smokers with less than a high school education at -0.22.309 
At any rate, it is clear that widespread smoking among the poor persists 
despite high cigarette taxes throughout the past decade.  Regressivity 
therefore remains a serious concern. 
 
                                                 
304 Gruber & Koszegi, Tax Incidence, supra note 18, at 1976.  By contrast, Gruber and Koszegi find an 
elasticity of -0.39 for smokers in the top income quartile.  Id. 
305 But see DeCicca et al., Older Adult Smoking, supra note 43, at 926–27 (finding that older, low-income 
smokers are very sensitive to cigarette taxes and stating that their findings are “consistent with Gruber and 
Koszegi”). 
306 Colman & Remler, supra note 152, at 376.  This compares to an elasticity of -0.20 among high-income 
groups.  Id. 
307 Matthew Farrelly et al., Response by Adults to Increases in Cigarette Prices by Sociodemographic 
Characteristics, 68 S. ECON. J. 156, 162 (2001).  This compares to an elasticity of -0.10 for the top half.  Id. at 
161. 
308 William Evans et al., Tobacco Taxes and Public Policy to Discourage Smoking 36, in 13 TAX POLICY 
AND THE ECONOMY 1 (James Poterba, ed., 1999). This compares to -0.17 for the top half.  Id. 
309 Nicolay Gaspodinov & Ian Irvine, Tobacco Taxes and Regressivity, 28 J. HEALTH ECON. 375, 380, 83 
(2009) (using Canadian data and concluding “that there is little to suggest from our data that the traditional 
regressivity perspective on tobacco taxes can be overturned, and that there is therefore little hope that such tax 
increases may really benefit low socioeconomic groups”).  The elasticity for high school and college graduates is 
approximately -0.3.  Id. at 380. 
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E.  Alternatives to Cigarette Taxes  
 
 We have seen that paternalistic cigarette taxes pose a number of 
problems.  First, cigarette taxes are a one-size-fits-all solution for 
addressing imperfect rationality.  The taxes do not accommodate 
heterogeneity, and because they significantly interfere with individual 
autonomy, cigarette taxes harm rational smokers.  Second, using cigarette 
taxes for paternalistic purposes poses a high risk of government failure.  
The government may adopt taxes that are too high and that reduce social 
welfare.  Finally, cigarette taxes are regressive and place a large burden on 
low-income families including the smoker herself. 
Given these problems, those concerned about the dangers of smoking 
should consider alternative products and policies.  This Section discusses 
four such alternatives.  These alternatives are potentially superior to 
cigarette taxes in that they are more suitable for a heterogeneous population, 
they pose a lower risk of government failure, and they do not place a large 
burden on the poor.  The purpose of this Section is not to commit to a 
particular proposal.  Rather, the point is that those who want to improve 
smokers’ health do not necessarily have to resort to cigarette taxes.  
Alternatives exist for achieving this objective while also avoiding the 
problems that cigarette taxes entail. 
 
1. The Commitment Contract for Smoking Cessation 
 
Xavier Gine and his colleagues have proposed and tested the idea of a 
commitment contract for smoking cessation.310  The commitment contract is 
designed to help smokers who have self-control problems.  In Gine’s 
experiment, a bank offered smokers a voluntary product to help them stop 
smoking.311  Those who accepted the offer placed money in a savings 
account for six months, after which time they submitted to a urine test to 
determine whether they had successfully quit.312  If they had, the bank 
returned their money.313  If they had not, they forfeited the money to 
charity.314  In other words, the contract with the bank served as a 
commitment device that increased the cost of failing to quit. 
The results of the experiment show that smokers are open to trying this 
type of product and that it can significantly reduce smoking.  About 11% of 
smokers who were offered the product signed a contract.315  This take-up 
                                                 
310 See generally Gine et al., supra note 30. 
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rate compares favorably with that of nicotine replacement therapy, and is 
particularly impressive considering that the product is new and 
unfamiliar.316  Moreover, those smokers who were offered the product were 
35% more likely than smokers in the control group to be nonsmokers after 
one year (as measured by a surprise follow-up urine test).317  These results 
also compare favorably with those produced by nicotine replacement 
therapy.318 
The primary advantage of the commitment contract vis-a-vis the 
cigarette tax is that it is voluntary.  Rather than taking a compulsory, one-
size-fits-all approach, it allows smokers who want to quit and who have 
self-control problems to identify themselves.  This eliminates concerns 
about heterogeneity and interfering with autonomy.319  It also reduces 
concerns about regressivity since it does not involve an involuntary tax on 
low-income smokers.  Moreover, the commitment contract could potentially 
be a profitable product offered by private businesses, reducing the need for 
government involvement.320 
 
2. The Smoking License 
 
Another approach for addressing self-control problems—one that would 
involve the government—is the smoking license.321  The government could 
establish a generally applicable cigarette tax that would reflect only 
interpersonal externalities.  Although the tax would not contain a 
paternalistic element, smokers would have to obtain a license in order to 
buy cigarettes.  The license would be accompanied by a smart card to be 
swiped at the point of sale.322  A smoker who wished to do so could 
establish an additional tax that would apply only to her and that would be 
added to her purchase when she swiped her card.323  In this way, smokers 
who have self-control problems could use the tax as a commitment device 
to help them quit.  A smoker could increase the tax at any time, but any tax 
reductions would take effect only after a long delay, which would facilitate 
the scheme’s effectiveness.324  In one version of the proposal, the collected 
tax would be deposited in an escrow account.325  The smoker would receive 
                                                 
316 Id. at 228. 
317 Id. at 215. 
318 Id. at 216. 
319 See Fennell, Willpower Taxes, supra note 23, at 1416–17 (discussing commitment devices). 
320 See Gine et al., supra note 30, at 228. 
321 Fennell, Revealing Options, supra note 30, at 1482–85; see generally Bhattacharya & Lakdawalla, supra 
note 30. 
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the funds in the account if she quit smoking and surrendered her license.326   
As with the commitment contract, the advantage of the smoking license 
is that the additional tax that is voluntary.  A smoker who does not have a 
self-control problem or who does not want to quit would pay only the 
generally applicable tax reflecting smoking’s external costs. 
 
3. Providing Information Regarding Cessation Aids 
 
Another way that the government could help smokers quit is to collect 
and disseminate (or facilitate the collection and dissemination of) 
information regarding cessation aids, e.g., varenicline, nicotine gum, and 
the nicotine patch.327  These products reduce non-pecuniary quitting costs 
and can be very effective at facilitating successful quit attempts.  For 
example, the estimated abstinence rate six months after quitting is 25.4%–
33.2% for varenicline (depending on dosage) and 19%–26.1% for nicotine 
gum (depending on duration of use).328  This compares to only 13.8% for 
placebo treatment.329  Abstinence rates are even higher for certain 
combination therapies, e.g., nicotine gum and the nicotine patch.330  As a 
result, the medical community strongly supports cessation aids and 
generally recommends their use in connection with all quit attempts.331   
But smokers do not appear to have received the message.  One study 
finds that fewer than 22% of current smokers who attempted to quit for at 
least one day in the preceding year used medication.332  This suggests that 
smokers may be uninformed about cessation aids and are unnecessarily 
setting themselves up for failure. 
 
4. Promoting Harm Reduction 
 
For those smokers not willing to completely give up cigarettes or 
nicotine, significant potential exists for reducing the harm associated with 
smoking.  But the predominant attitude toward smoking among public 
health advocates is “just say no.”333  This abstinence-only approach reflects 
the fear that reducing the risks involved will encourage some people to 
                                                 
326 The smoker might also be permitted to withdrawal amounts to pay smoking-related medical expenses.  Id. 
At death, any balance in the account would revert to the state.  Id. at 1484 n.314. 
327 Given that this program would benefit smokers, it should be paid for using cigarette taxes. 
328 U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., supra note 16, at 109. 
329 Id. 
330 Id. 
331 Id. at 106 (“Clinicians should encourage all patients attempting to quit to use effective medications for 
tobacco dependence treatment, except where contraindicated or for specific populations for which there is 
insufficient evidence of effectiveness.”) 
332 Id. at 12. 
333 Kenneth E. Warner, Reducing Harm to Smokers: Methods, Their Effectiveness, and the Role of Policy, in 
REGULATING TOBACCO 111, 113 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman, eds., 2001). 
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smoke.334  But despite decades of deterrence efforts, over 20% of American 
adults are smokers.335  So even modest progress toward harm reduction 
would potentially prolong the lives of tens of millions of people, which 
makes the abstinence-only approach extremely difficult to justify. 
Various methods exist for reducing the risks posed by smoking.336  
These include substituting safer nicotine-delivery systems (e.g., long-term 
use of nicotine gum), smoking fewer cigarettes, and switching to less 
dangerous tobacco products (e.g., smokeless tobacco).337   
But because smokers seem to enjoy various aspects of cigarettes and not 
just their capacity to deliver nicotine, the most promising technologies are 
safer cigarettes and pseudo-cigarettes.338  Tobacco companies are 
experimenting with the composition of cigarettes to make them less 
harmful.339  They are also developing cigarette-like devices that mimic 
many of the features of cigarettes but contain fewer toxins.340 
So what can the government do to promote harm reduction?  W. Kip 
Viscusi argues that the government should encourage the development of 
safer cigarettes and pseudo-cigarettes by creating a comprehensive rating 
system that would allow smokers to compare the risks posed by these 
products to those posed by traditional cigarettes.341   
A government rating system would have two significant benefits.  First, 
it would allow consumers to select the cigarettes that match their risk 
preferences.342  Second, and more importantly, it would give tobacco 
companies a greater incentive to produce safer cigarettes and pseudo-
cigarettes.343  The government currently discourages these products by 
restricting advertising and threatening sanctions, which impedes tobacco 
companies from competing on the basis of safety.344  This policy apparently 
stems from the belief that people should just say no to smoking.  But 
competition based on safety would potentially prolong lives.  And a 
government rating system would ensure that tobacco companies could not 
mislead consumers through false advertising. 
Reducing the harm associated with smoking has the potential to benefit 
                                                 
334 Id. at 121–23. 
335 CDC, supra note 26, at 88. 
336 For a discussion of harm-reduction methods, see Warner, supra note 333, at 117–25. 
337 Id. at 117–25. 
338 For a discussion of safer cigarettes and pseudo-cigarettes, see id. at 119–23. 
339 Id. at 119–23. 
340 Id. at 119–23. 
341 VISCUSI, SMOKE-FILLED ROOMS, supra note 106, at 195.  Since the rating system would benefit smokers, 
the program should be funded by cigarette taxes. 
342 Id.  Currently, cigarette companies disclose tar and nicotine levels on cigarette packages.  Id. at 198.  But 
this information is incomplete and inconclusive.  Id. at 200.  For example, people may inhale low-tar cigarettes 
more deeply, which could offset the health benefits of the lower tar level.  Id.  A comprehensive rating system 
would take into account the different ways in which people smoke different types of cigarettes.  Id. 
343 Id. at 195–96. 
344 Id. at 206–09. 
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all smokers, whether they are rational or not.  Safer cigarettes, for example, 
would allow rational smokers to enjoy what they perceive as the benefits of 
smoking while avoiding some of the health costs.  At the same time, those 
who suffer from failures of rationality would be better off to the extent that 
the cigarettes that they smoke are less harmful. 
 
V. YOUTH SMOKING 
 
Because they may be shortsighted or fail to appreciate how addictive 
cigarettes are, most people can agree that children should not be trusted 
with the decision to smoke.  So paternalistic intervention to reduce youth 
smoking is relatively uncontroversial.  Even those who believe that adults 
should be free to smoke have little reason to oppose narrowly targeted 
regulation of youth smoking, which at most, delays the initiation decision to 
adulthood.  As a result, antismoking advocates often argue for higher 
cigarette taxes on the grounds that they will prevent children from 
smoking.345  But the use of cigarette taxes for this purpose is subject to three 
criticisms. 
First, cigarette taxes are an extremely blunt tool for combating youth 
smoking.346  Adults smoke 98% of all cigarettes,347 so they pay a significant 
price, particularly given how regressive cigarette taxes are. 
The second criticism is that cigarette taxes may not be as effective at 
reducing youth smoking as is sometimes claimed.  Early studies suggested a 
youth price participation elasticity of -0.7, which means that a 10% increase 
in price reduces smoking participation among youths by 7%.348  But more 
recent studies have produced mixed results, with some researchers finding 
significantly less sensitivity to price.349  For example, a study by 
Christopher Carpenter and Philip Cook published in 2008 found youth 
participation elasticities between -0.25 and -0.56.350  Several other studies 
reached a similar conclusion or found even less responsiveness.351  As a 
                                                 
345 See, e.g., Harry Esteve, Cigarette Tax Proposals Pit Anti-Smokers against Tobacco Lobby, THE 
OREGONIAN, March 24, 2011. 
346 Viscusi, Paternalism, supra note 150, at 64. 
347 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE PROPOSED TOBACCO SETTLEMENT 9 (1998). 
348 Philip DeCicca et al., Putting Out the Fires: Will Higher Taxes Reduce the Onset of Youth Smoking?, 110 
J. POL. ECON. 144, 145 (2002) [hereinafter DeCicca et al., Fires]. 
349 For recent reviews of the literature, see Anindya Sen et al., Do Changes in Cigarette Taxes Impact Youth 
Smoking? Evidence from Canadian Provinces, 13 FORUM HEALTH ECON. & POL’Y 1, 2–4 (2010) and Christopher 
Carpenter and Philip Cook, Cigarette Taxes and Youth Smoking: New Evidence from National, State, and Local 
Youth Risk Behavior Surveys, 27 J. HEALTH ECON. 287, 287–91 (2008). 
350 Carpenter & Cook, supra note 349, at 297. 
351 See, e.g., DeCicca et al., Fires, supra note 348, at 164 (“When we estimate models of smoking onset 
between eighth and twelfth grades, the results suggest that cigarette taxes and smoking onset are not strongly 
related.”); Anindya Sen & Tony Wirjanto, Estimating the Impacts of Cigarette Taxes on Youth Smoking 
Participation, Initiation, and Persistence: Empirical Evidence from Canada, 19 HEALTH ECON. 1264, 1279 
(2010) (using Canadian data and finding “that while taxes do impact youth smoking, the effects are somewhat 
modest”).  Similarly, Philip DeCicca and his colleagues find that “the price of cigarettes has a weak and 
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result, one recent study stated “there exists conflicting evidence on the 
efficacy of cigarette taxes with respect to youth smoking participation.”352  
Another study concluded, “it is fair to say that there is still no consensus on 
whether taxes have a true causal effect on youth participation in 
smoking.”353 
One reason that recent studies find less price sensitivity may be that 
many early studies did not adequately control for variation among states 
regarding antismoking sentiment and nontax tobacco control policies.354  
States that have high cigarette taxes tend also to have high antismoking 
sentiment and to have adopted antismoking policies other than cigarette 
taxes.356  So the lower youth smoking rate in those states may be largely 
attributable to factors other than taxes, including social and cultural 
influences.357  A series of studies by Philip DeCicca and his colleagues 
demonstrates that controlling for antismoking sentiment can dramatically 
reduce the measured responsiveness of smoking to cigarette taxes.358  
DeCicca concludes that “[t]he evidence is consistent with the argument that 
unobservable heterogeneity across states in antismoking sentiment leads to 
a bias [in many early studies] toward finding strong tax effects.”359 
The third criticism is that for many potential smokers, cigarette taxes 
may simply delay smoking to adulthood, when cigarettes become more 
affordable.  Since the health consequences of smoking generally result from 
smoking over a long period, the primary goal of antismoking policies is not 
to reduce youth smoking per se, but to reduce adult smoking by avoiding 
initiation during adolescence.360  Many antismoking advocates argue that 
because most smokers smoke their first cigarette during adolescence, 
eliminating youth smoking via cigarette taxes will eventually eliminate 
                                                                                                                            
statistically insignificant influence on [youth] smoking participation,” but find that taxes may reduce the number 
of cigarettes smoked by young adult smokers.  Philip DeCicca et al., Youth Smoking, Cigarette Prices, and Anti-
Smoking Sentiment, 17 HEALTH ECON. 733, 739–40, 745 (2008) [hereinafter DeCicca et al., Sentiment].  
Additionally, a study using data from Canada finds participation elasticities between -0.1 and -0.3 for 15 to 19 
year olds and -1.5 to -2 for 10 to 14 year olds, which suggests the possibility that “higher taxes may delay 
smoking participation among younger teens until they become older and are able to participate more freely in the 
labour force.”  Sen et al., supra note 349, at 11. 
352 Sen et al., supra note 349, at 4. 
353 Carpenter & Cook, supra note 349, at 290. 
354 DeCicca et al., Sentiment, supra note 351, at 745 (“We also find that indirect proxies for anti-smoking 
sentiment used in several previous cross-sectional studies do not seem to adequately control for differences in 
anti-smoking sentiment across states.”); DeCicca et al., Transition, supra note 57, at 909–11; DeCicca et al., 
Fires, supra note 348, at 153–54.     
356 DeCicca et al., Sentiment, supra note 351, at 734–37. 
357 DeCicca et al., Sentiment, supra note 351, at 734; DeCicca et al., Transition, supra note 57, at 909; 
DeCicca et al., Fires, supra note 348, at 159–61.  
358 DeCicca et al., Sentiment, supra note 351, at 739–40; DeCicca et al., Transition, supra note 57, at 911–
13; DeCicca et al., Fires, supra note 348, at 148–49.  See also Carpenter & Cook, supra note 349, at 296 (drawing 
a similar conclusion). 
359 DeCicca et al., Fires, supra note 348, at 164. 
360 Sherry Glied, Youth Tobacco Control: Reconciling Theory and Empirical Evidence, 21 J. HEALTH ECON. 
117, 118 (2002). 
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adult smoking.361  But this view may not be correct.  As an initial matter, 
DeCicca and his colleagues found that “nearly half of smokers at around 
age 26 were not daily smokers as high school seniors,” which suggests that 
many people initiate daily smoking as young adults.362  (In fact, most 
adolescent smokers are experimenters who have smoked less than 100 
cigarettes in their lifetimes.363)   
Moreover, several studies of the relationship between youth and adult 
smoking challenge the conventional wisdom that preventing childhood 
initiation permanently deters people from smoking.364  One of these studies 
was conducted by Sherry Glied, who analyzed a dataset involving a panel of 
people followed from 1979 (when they were 14- to 24-years old) through 
1994 (when they were 29- to 39-years old).  She finds that cigarette taxes 
reduce youth smoking, but that the effect is substantially attenuated over 
time.365  In fact, taxes faced during youth appear to have little effect on 
smoking by age 39.366  Glied suggests that this is a consequence of delayed 
initiation.367  Her “results suggest that high cigarette prices may have a 
more limited long-term deterrent effect than previously believed.”368  As a 
result, “reducing smoking among teens through tax policy may not be 
sufficient to substantially reduce smoking in adulthood.”369      
Given that cigarette taxes are overbroad and may not be as effective as 
previously thought, a better and more narrowly targeted approach to youth 
smoking is to rigorously enforce youth access restrictions.370  There is 
evidence that this will substantially reduce cigarette purchases by 
children.371   
                                                 
361 See, e.g., AM. LEGACY FOUNDATION, LEGACY FIRST REPORT 3, 6 (2000) (“Clearly, if adolescents can be 
dissuaded from starting to smoke, there is evidence that they will likely never become smokers.”). 
362 DeCicca et al., Transition, supra note 57, at 905; see also AM. LEGACY FOUNDATION, supra note 360, at 
6–7 (presenting survey evidence that about 48% of smokers who were between 30- and 39-years old in 1998 
reported having begun daily smoking after age 17).  
363 AM. LEGACY FOUNDATION, supra note 360, at 3. 
364 For a review of this literature, see M. Christopher Auld & Mahmood Zarrabi, Long-Term Effects of 
Tobacco Prices Faced by Adolescents 3 (2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).  Auld and Zarrabi 
review studies that investigate whether reducing youth initiation deters people from smoking as adults and studies 
that investigate whether smoking while young causes smoking later in life.  Id.  They state that “the small body of 
literature to date on long smoking dynamics unanimously suggests that prior smoking does not substantially cause 
current smoking over the medium to long run.”  Id. 
365 Glied, supra note 359, at 117. 
366 Id. at 126. 
367 Id. at 117. 
368 Id. at 132.  In a study using Canadian data, Christopher Auld and Mahmood Zarrabi reach conclusions 
generally consistent with those of Glied.  See generally Auld & Zarrabi, supra note 363.  Auld and Zarrabi state 
that “[o]ur major finding is that high prices faced during adolescence exert a small but detectable effect on 
smoking patterns later in life: A 10% increase in average cigarette prices faced over ages 12 through 18 leads to a 
one percentage point reduction in probability of daily smoking in adulthood.”  Id. at 1.  They conclude that “these 
estimates suggest the effect of youth price on adult smoking behavior is almost certainly very small.”  Id. at 16. 
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Aside from lax enforcement, the major problem with youth access 
restrictions, particularly age-of-sale laws, is that some children respond by 
obtaining their cigarettes through adults.  Due to more rigorous enforcement 
of age-of-sale laws, the percentage of underage smokers who usually buy 
their cigarettes fell from 38.7% to 18.8% between 1995 and 2003.372  At the 
same time, the percentage who usually obtained cigarettes by giving 
someone else money to buy them jumped from 16% to 30%.373   
Fortunately, there may be a relatively easy solution to this problem.  All 
states prohibit the sale of cigarettes to persons under age 18.374  The 
problem is that many minors have regular contact with 18-year olds at 
school and elsewhere.   But their social circles generally do not include 
those over age 21.375  This probably explains why one study finds that 90% 
of adults approached by minors to purchase cigarettes are under age 21.376  
Raising the minimum age for legal sale to 21 would cut off a major supply 
source and make it difficult for children to become regular smokers.377 
This proposal is potentially politically feasible.  One survey found that 
63% of people are in favor of the age increase.378  Moreover, the idea has 
been debated in several states in recent years.379  Libertarians of course will 
be reluctant to embrace it.  In the words of one California assemblyman, “I 
think that people are going to wonder whether 18-year olds who can join the 
armed forces should have the right to smoke and make that choice on their 
own.”380  But there is a good response to this type of argument.  First, the 
goal of the law is not to reduce smoking among 18- to 21-year olds per se, 
although it might have this effect.  Rather, the goal would be to reduce 
smoking among children, who often obtain cigarettes through young adults.  
                                                 
372 Sajjad Ahmad & John Billimek, Limiting Youth Access to Tobacco: Comparing the Long-Term Health 
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119 (1994). 
375 Ahmad & Billimek, supra note 371, at 379. 
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Second, in terms of preserving freedom, raising the minimum age for legal 
sale is arguably superior to high cigarette taxes, which is perhaps the only 
viable policy alternative for addressing youth smoking.  To the extent that 
increasing the minimum age for legal sale prevents kids from smoking, one 
of the primary rationales for the cigarette tax would disappear, as perhaps 
would much of the political support for further cigarette tax increases.  
    
CONCLUSION 
 
Although they are popular among legislators, cigarette taxes are difficult 
to justify using the conventional framework for tax analysis.  Smoking’s 
external costs are arguably small, and heavily taxing cigarettes imposes a 
significant, regressive burden on low-income families, raising fairness 
concerns.  This has led some scholars and antismoking advocates to invoke 
paternalism in support of further cigarette tax increases.   
If smoking results from incapacitation or imperfect rationality, perhaps 
the government should intervene to save smokers from themselves.  But this 
Article has argued that cigarette taxes should not be used for that purpose.  
Existing evidence suggests that for many, smoking may be a rational 
choice.  And even if some smokers are incapacitated by addiction, cigarette 
taxes penalize them for consuming a product that they find difficult to quit.  
In addition, cigarette taxes are a one-size-fits-all solution.  They are 
unsuitable for a smoking population that is likely heterogeneous with 
respect to rationality.  Moreover, smokers respond to cigarette taxes in ways 
that undercut public health goals. 
Given the many problems with cigarette taxes, policy makers should 
consider alternatives for helping smokers who want to quit or who would 
prefer a safer nicotine delivery system.  This Article has examined several 
proposals of this type.  Advances in our understanding of smoking will 
make other products and policies possible, creating the potential to improve 
public health while leaving smokers free to pursue their own goals. 
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